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Security

SECURITY POLICE DEPLOYMENT PLANNING

This handbook provides planners and defense force commanders (DFC) factors to consider when building and implementing operational plans (OPLANs). It acquaints them with the principles and concepts of security police deployment. It stresses the importance of continuous quality improvements in the OPLAN process.

Paragraph

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FOREWORD

We have tended in the past to be tempted to size, train, and equip for the last war. We have all heard this, and to some extent it is true. While the last war gives us the most recent lessons, there is great wisdom from our total history as well. This handbook attempts to capture lessons from Vietnam, Panama, Europe, JCS exercises, and contingency deployments such as Somalia as well as from the Desert Storm experience. There is an interesting school of thought that Desert Storm--while a thunderous success for the country and the Air Force--may mean an increased threat for the security police to counter in the future. No enemy can afford to disregard the impact of air power again. The U.S. cannot now, or for the foreseeable future, be easily defeated in the air, so the logical alternative is to stop air power on the ground. The security police job just got harder.

The threat we will be charged to counter is dynamic and diverse. We have witnessed, at least temporarily, the decline of the massive Soviet threat, only to be replaced by numerous differing threats in multiple regions. Our base defense role remains the same - D^3 (detect, delay, destroy). We will still have our OPLANs as "canned" packages, but contingency roles will expand. We will still be securing airfields in far-flung places, but now for the purpose of regional contingencies, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and humanitarian relief. It is clear the threat is still real and present. General war may be more unlikely today, but the possibility of an actual deployment on a real-world mission has never been greater. The importance of the planning process has grown accordingly.

We are in a period of rapid base defense equipment modernization. We are receiving the M16A2, Squad Automatic Weapon, and Scope Shield II radios. Tactical Automated Sensor Systems and hand-held Global Positioning Systems are on the near horizon. All these items serve to increase our capability. We must accept that our adversaries have climbed on the modernization bandwagon also. We have to think in terms of a threat enhanced by the addition of night vision capability, sensors, modern small arms, more and better man-portable stand-off ground-to-air and ground-to-ground weapons. It means that the area we need to be concerned about is expanding.

Total Quality Management has come to base defense as it has to most of the rest of the Air Force. You can see this in our new Air Force instructions (AFIs) that are replacing regulations. The AFIs are much shorter, more focused, and broader. You will no longer be given the "lock-step by the book" base defense guidance. The "we've always done it that way" answer is no longer good enough. You will have more latitude in the way you accomplish your job. The challenge is that the planner and the defense force commander will have to have an even more intimate understanding of the mission, doctrine, strategy, and tactics since regulations will no longer provide all the answers. The reward is that we can now use the full potential of our planners and commanders to innovatively manage the mission.

When we initially developed the planners guide, the focus was to ensure a planner knew what was available for employment. In this, the second edition, the focus has changed and broadened from a simple catalogue of base defense UTCs. It now includes the how to and why of

employment. We are going to talk some basic doctrine, policy, and tactics as they relate to the mission. This is not the sum of our defense philosophy, but it is a concise compilation of some of the major ideas that drive planning and employment. The mission of this handbook is to assist both the planner and the defense force commander in the successful building and implementation of the OPLAN.

The rapid pace of change that accompanies a reduction in our force size always breeds a certain amount of turmoil and uneasiness. This time we are attempting to "rightsize" the force to meet the requirements of our warfighting mission. We are getting smaller but our fighting elements have more capability. We can work smarter, and we are. We can train smarter, and we are. We can equip smarter, and we are. We must plan and implement smarter; and that's where we count on you the planners and defense force commanders. Never has it been more true that flexibility is the key. The axiom of innovate, adapt, and overcome will take on new meaning and importance for the future of the security police.

FEEDBACK

The planning environment is a dynamic one and the operational employment of our base defense forces is in your hands. Be a leader, be prepared. This document will require review periodically and update as changes occur. We encourage your comments and inputs to improving the quality of this document. Please provide yours on the comment sheets at the end of the handbook. POCs are HQ AFSPA/SPSD, DSN 246-1994, and HQ USAF/SPO, DSN 224-8648.

Chapter 1

SECURITY POLICE DOCTRINE

1.1. Doctrine. Air Force security police are the primary combat support forces for providing defense of AF operations worldwide. Throughout the spectrum from peacetime, contingency operations, to war; security police are responsible for ensuring a secure operational environment for the generation, launch, and sustainment of air combat operations.

1.1.1. **AF Policy Directive 31-3**. It provides these main policy statements:

- During crisis, AF war fighting resources are vulnerable to attack from hostile ground and air elements. An effective defensive posture must be established to allow generation, launch, and sustainment of sorties.
- Air base defense (ABD) forces will have primary responsibility for level I and II threats in the AOR surrounding air bases. ABD forces should be capable of delaying level III threats.

  -- Outside the AF AOR, U.S. Army, USMC, or host-nation (HN) forces will have sole responsibility for security requirements.

- Defense forces will be flexible, highly deployable, and trained to undertake their ABD tasks as part of a force protection mission.
- Defense force organizational structure; vehicles; weaponry; C^3; will be tailored for operations according to the USAF War and Mobilization Plan.
- A terminal air defense capability will be fielded at specific locations.
- US, HN, and coalition support forces will be incorporated into base defense planning and operations to the fullest extent possible.

1.1.2. **AF Instruction 31-301**. AFI 31-301, Air Base Defense, provides this synopsis of the ABD mission:

- Base defense forces must maintain a secure environment by detecting and engaging enemy forces that threaten sustained air operations. These forces must be organized to prevent and defeat attacks rather than to react passively. They must be integrated into rear area security operations with other services, HN, and allied forces. Security police forces must also be prepared to support peacetime contingency operations. These include coping with civil disturbances, terrorist activities, political instability, noncombatant evacuation operations, and other emergency situations.

  -- Defending USAF resources is the responsibility of all air base personnel. USAF personnel who are armed and trained (for example, Prime Beef, Prime Ribs, combat communications units, and selectively armed personnel) must take an active part in base defense. Senior Air Force commanders at each base must aggressively pursue selective arming and augmentation programs. If the threat requires more armed personnel than are already in

place, commanders must plan for time-phased, force deployment list (TPFDL) reinforcements.

-- The senior Air Force commander organizes, plans, trains, and equips base defense forces. The commander improves base defense as necessary by arranging additional support from other US services and HN support forces. This support includes reviewing and updating theater HN and joint agreements to protect theater air operations.

1.1.3. **Defense Force Commander.** The Chief of Security Police acts as the air base DFC ensuring base defense functions are planned, coordinated, and integrated. He establishes an ABD operations center to provide a focal point for command and control of defense operations. When possible establishing liaison with US, HN, and allied forces.

1.2. Principles of Defense. The following Principles of War from AFM 1-1 are adapted for ABD.

- **Knowledge of the Enemy.** Knowledge of the enemy's capabilities, vulnerabilities, and likely intentions is essential to prepare for combat operations, prevent surprise, and protect the airfield. Experience has shown you will normally not have sufficient intelligence available to predict enemy action. This fact makes detection of the level I and level II enemy the primary challenge for base defense forces.

- **Unity of Effort.** Unity of command is the cornerstone for uninterrupted support of the main effort and the protection of the airfield. The keys are sound planning, detection, COMSEC, and the rapid deployment of forces and resources to counter the threat. Air base defense plans must be adequate, coordinated, and complementary to applicable tenants, other US services, and/or HN forces.

- **Economy of Force.** This principle involves ABD security forces defending airfields against threat levels. They must be able to detect, assess, and deploy against the threat under all weather, visibility conditions, and on any terrain. Sectoring an air base and assigning forces to each sector aids in dealing with multiple situations that are likely to occur. Maintaining a mobile reserve force to be committed to serious engagements will assist in countering larger scale threats. The Base Defense Operations Center provides essential command and control of all base defense forces.

- **Responsiveness.** This principle is key to defeating enemy incursions against an airfield. It involves the immediate reaction and rapid deployment of ABD and friendly forces to destroy the enemy and to minimize damage. Responsiveness is achieved through:

  -- Effective command relationships and command supervision.
  -- Reliable communications.
  -- Centralized planning and decentralized execution.
  -- Accurate intelligence.
  -- Organic mobility of base defense forces.
  -- Training and rehearsals.

-- Early detection of the threat.
-- Prioritization of air base resources vulnerabilities.

- **Flexibility.** This is the ability to adapt to the changing situation and requirements of the mission. Understand and use initiative. Be prepared to take action independently if necessary. Don't rely on home station operating procedures in a crisis situation. Adapt quickly to the current situation; project ahead.

1.3. Joint Operations. Air Force power projection and support in future conflicts will almost without exception be joint operations. Two or more services will be called upon to provide military involvement and presence in nearly every theater. Typically a Joint Task Force (JTF) will be established to handle a contingency or crisis situation. It is the COMJTF who will task a tactical combat force to deal with level III threats to air bases. Security police forces should understand joint doctrine and be ready to function with other U.S. forces during these operations. Every effort must be made to clearly communicate and clarify base defense operations with other services. Doctrine outling Joint Rear Area operations can be found in JCS Pub 3-10, Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations, and JCS Pub 3-10.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) for Base Defense.

1.4. Host Nation Forces. While operating in foreign countries, air operations are primarily conducted from air bases in the rear area which belong to a friendly HN. Host nation and or coalition forces may be providing support for defense of AF operations while deployed to a foreign base. Consideration for HN rules of engagement and local laws will impact the conduct of base defense operations. Security police leaders must request and provide for the integration of these HN or coalition forces. The level of support provided by these forces may vary greatly depending on their commitment and capabilities. Adapting to these levels is paramount to successful air base defense. To ensure mission accomplishment, it is critical to develop a working rapport with host nations forces. US Army Psycological Operations and Civil Affairs (G-5) are responsible for interfacing with the local populace.

1.5. Force Multipliers. With the reduction in manpower available as a result of the military drawdown, security police base defense forces must capitalize on a variety of force multipliers to assist in providing defense of Air Force resources.

- Vehicles are key elements in providing mobility to our forces. Mobile patrolling of the AOR and having a mobile reserve force to respond to intrusions are the backbone of base defense operations. Additionally, some type armored vehicles are critical in this enviroment. Response forces utilizing armored vehicles with mounted machine guns become the counter punch needed to destroy a level II threat, or delay a level III attack.
- Good communications provide the ability to react quickly and give base defense leaders the ability to adapt to crisis situations. Scope Shield II tactical radios provide this capability with full coverage of the AOR by use of repeaters extending range.
- Crew served weapons add a large amount of flexibility and fire power to base defense forces. Heavy weapons are excellent for use as deterrent measures and provide essential firepower for covering response forces and blocking avenues of approach.

- Detecting the enemy is essential to be able to deter or defeat the threat. A variety of sensor capabilities are or will be available. Listening posts and observation posts are a first line of detection. Military working dog teams can be instrumental in patrolling, deterrence, and detection in a variety of situations. Miniature Intrusion Detection System (MIDS) can provide a limited avenue of approach capability when deployed in low traffic areas. Tactical Automated Sensor Systems will provide expanded capability for multi-levels of detection at a variety of locations.

1.6. Area of Responsibility (AOR). The base defense area of responsibility is not necessarily limited to the base perimeter, although joint or HN forces may be responsible for outside the wire. The AOR, and particularly the area of interest must begin at the resource and extend outward to include those likely avenues of approach or potential key terrain areas from which the enemy can threaten air operations. The majority of SP forces operate in a built up or urban environment and should be trained in military operations in urban terrain (MOUT) techniques. Nearby hills, woods, or built up areas could provide vulnerability to stand off weapons. Specific attention should be paid to the foot print for surface to air missiles on each end of the runway. The whole AOR doesn't necessarily have to be occupied with base defense forces. Joint, HN, friendly villagers or local police interest can help. If possible, mobile or foot patrolling could help detect or deter threats in these areas. The bottom line is we can't neglect any part of the AOR and must use all possible combinations of available forces. If necessary, we should aggressively pursue additional assistance.

1.7. Leadership. The job of all ABD leaders from the DFC to the squad and fire team leader is to ensure the forces under their control are trained, organized, and equipped to perform their mission. That doesn't necessarily mean leading the charge, but does mean providing leadership, experience, and motivation to accomplish each mission. By taking charge and aggressively pursuing action at each level, the ability of the whole unit to succeed is increased. Take your mission and the function you play in that mission seriously--lives depend on your success.

1.8. Base Defense Training. Training for base defense operations is accomplished at many levels. Peacetime operations can detract from the important preparation of preparing for combat. Almost all of our security police forces receive individual training. Continuation training is conducted at unit level and MAJCOM centers. Not all individuals will have the opportunity to train as a unit. However, with attendance at the Joint Readiness Training Center or MAJCOM training every 3 years at a minimum, most security police individuals should have the basic concepts of base defense. With continued emphasis and priority of training at home station, the task of integrating several units at a deployed location will be enhanced.

1.9. Intelligence. Intelligence provides the much needed knowledge of the enemy. Intelligence support for AF base defense forces must be sought from several sources. AF intelligence can provide intelligence from a variety of sources. Deployed intelligence units can access these sources through Sentinel Byte and prepare a variety of intelligence products. Security police forces must request this support specifically, because local intelligence branches will be focusing on providing air threat intelligence for flying operations. Maps, charts, and geographic data should be requested through local intelligence branches. AFOSI can provide counterintelligence

which is focused on terrorists, saboteurs, and enemy sympathizers. When possible and given time, AFOSI can build a source network in the AOR. Establishing contact with other U.S. forces and HN forces must also be done to ensure every possible intelligence network is utilized. Defense force leaders must actively seek out intelligence to stay current with changing situations.

1.10. Close Air Support (CAS). The senior installation commander will be closely involved in the requests for and control of CAS aircraft in emergency situations where they are available and required. Security police must plan for this possibility and conduct preliminary training and coordination so that if CAS aircraft are called upon to assist in the defense of an air base it can be effectively employed. If the threat warrants continuous CAS, work through the wing command post to ensure a tactical control center coordinates and controls the employment of CAS aircraft. Essential advance planning is required to ensure all friendly base defense force positions in the AOR are well known to the tactical control center and CAS aircraft.

1.11. Transportation. The US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), is responsible for providing air, land, and sea, common user transportation for the Department of Defense, both in time of peace and war. CINCTRANS is the single manager for transportation, other than service unique or theater-assigned transportation assets. To accomplish this mission, the Air Force's arm of USTRANSCOM, the Air Mobility Command (AMC), has an en route system. The en route system is a global network composed of manpower and materiel designed to support AMC forces worldwide. The system is composed of key locations serving as waypoints for aircraft and air crews to continue throughout the transportation system with minimal delays. The enroute system provides the ability to rapidly expand operations during contingencies and war, and is the conduit for DOD's rapid global power projection capability. The components of the en route system are the Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC), the Air Mobility Control Center (AMCC), and Tanker Airlift Control Elements (TALCEs). Security Police may be required to deploy with a TALCE and establish security for airfield operations.

1.12. Summary. This chapter and the rest of this planning guide should not be considered the sum total of doctrine. There are a number of documents which provide Joint, AF, operational, and tactical doctrine for security police base defense forces. Thorough familiarity with the concepts and prior preparation and planning with this information will better prepare security police forces for the variety of missions they may be called upon to perform. A listing of some of the applicable SP publications is included in the Air Base Defense Architecture at attachment 8.

Chapter 2

FACTORS AFFECTING PLANNING

2.1. Predeployment. Planners and commanders must consider a myriad of factors when determining what type and number of mobility forces will be required for a mission (see Predeployment Considerations Checklist, Chapter 4). Some factors are dynamic, e.g.; weather, political climate, intelligence, while some remain constant (or at least in written form with a published date) e.g.; treaties and status of forces agreements (SOFA). Some factors are not only critical during the initial planning stages but become more critical as the mission is executed. For example, intelligence (Intel), weather, terrain, and rules of engagement (ROE) information may change frequently as the situation dictates.

2.1.1. **Intelligence.** Intelligence is the first step in deployment planning and continues throughout the employment phase, through mission completion and redeployment. Intelligence establishes what the threat is and provides information on the enemy's nature, strength, location, capabilities, limitations, mobility, and probable courses of action. Intelligence also provides information on weather and terrain which assists planners in determining the types of special equipment necessary for a specific plan or deployment. The threat drives the types of forces required to defend air operations. OPLANs should direct the deployment of forces in sufficient numbers to rapidly eliminate the identified threat.

2.1.2. **Defense Force Planning Models.** Two basic planning models have been developed to assist in planning. See the high end and low end models. After evaluating the mission, intelligence, and situation, certain assumptions are usually made. A risk analysis must be made and decisions made by command levels. These models are only a starting point for planners. The anticipated situation will determine how each of the assumptions listed with the models apply; and how base defense forces will be employed.

2.2. Deployment. In order for USAF mobility forces to be successful in their missions, they must deploy with the proper equipment and be able to sustain operations (see Deployment Considerations Checklist, Chapter 4). LOGDETs are developed specifically for each mobility UTC and are designed to allow UTCs to operate in varied environments. LOGDETs are developed to support the UTCs mission capability (MISCAP) statement listed in the Wartime Mobilization Plan (WMP) 3, Part 2. However, situations may arise that task UTCs for other than wartime operations. In this instance, UTC LOGDETs should be tailored to meet the mission requirements. Additionally, to support taskings not suited to an established SP UTC, planners may tailor personnel and equipment packages (UTC QFZ99) to meet specific requirements. UTCs may be deployed to a variety of base types and may encounter different support capabilities at each location. The majority of SP UTCs are capable of existing for 5 days without support, but some are not (the equipment detail portion of this handbook will provide that information). Vehicle support is a critical consideration since mobility is a force multiplier for SP UTCs. Planners and commanders must increase force levels to compensate for vehicle shortfalls. Armored vehicles should be employed (if and when available) with the mobile reserve or quick reaction forces. It may become necessary for vehicles to be contracted. Planners should ensure

that transportation support is in place to support SP UTCs since their missions may require movement of personnel and equipment over distances.

2.3. Employment. When deployed, USAF mobility forces are subject to numerous laws, codes, or agreements which may affect the conduct of a given mission. Each AOR has unique requirements. Planners and commanders must ensure they are aware of all legal limitations affecting forces and that plans address and adjust to them (these are specifically identified in ground ROE). For example, federal forces deployed within the U.S. or its territories are restricted from enforcing civil law due to the Posse Commitatus Act, except under martial law. U.S. forces deployed to a foreign nation are subject to the law of that nation, international law, as well as the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). These limitations may involve everything from the number of troops allowed in country (troop ceiling) to who is authorized to operate a motor vehicle. Status of forces agreements (SOFAs) may preclude certain forces or weapons because of population density or HN forces already in place with similar missions assigned. Military alliances such as NATO have agreements, i.e., standard NATO agreements (STANAGS) which specify standard operating procedures for all alliance partners. The United Nations provides specific charters for operations sanctioned by them. Planners must be intimately familiar with all these factors when developing plans. Insist on specific ROE from the chain of command. Remember, Air Force Intelligence (AF/IN), obtains classified information ROE that pertain to pilots, so when requesting ensure you ask specifically for ground ROE. The impact of effective planning will be immediately felt when arranging transportation for mobility forces. Excess personnel and equipment preempt other uses of critical airlift or other transportation assets. During major contingencies or conflicts, UTCs are programmed to deploy per OPLANs to specific locations. Main operating bases (MOBs) are bases already possessing resources and an established infrastructure. Collocated operating bases (COBs) are controlled by allied forces, and used by US forces. Standby bases (SBs) are ordinarily located within an established AOR and are specifically designed and maintained for wartime operations. Limited bases (LBs) are austerely manned and usually possess some minor operation during peacetime, but, with personnel augmentation, are capable of expanding into a full-scale air base operation. Bare bases (BBs) are locations that possess only a usable runway, taxiway, and parking area, as well as a source of water that can be made potable. General guidance on these deployment locations can be found in AFI 10-301, USAF Mobility Planning. Specific deployment locations for UTCs can be found in Appendix 1 to Annex A of the applicable OPLAN, and is classified information. Peacetime or contingency operations require flexibility when planning how and where to use SP UTCs. These situations ordinarily arise quickly and require swift response, so deployment location, support availability, and specific mission may have to be determined as the situation unfolds. In summary, the US military has the potential to perform a myriad of roles outside the parameters of war and security police forces are structured to protect AF elements engaged in these operations (see Employment Checklist, Chapter 4).

2.4. Redeployment. Deployed forces will be required to relocate upon cessation of hostilities, or in response to subsequent tasking or redeployment to another location or theater. In either case, the leadership of the UTC being redeployed must be concerned with accounting for all LOGDET equipment, administrative requirements and scheduling transportation. The UTC troop

commander should apply the same considerations for the redeployment of the team, as for the initial deployment (see Redeployment Checklist, Chapter 4).

Chapter 3

SECURITY POLICE UNIT TYPE CODES (UTC)

3.1. SP UTC General Information. Security Police forces possess the manpower, weapons, equipment, and skills necessary for installation commanders to establish a secure environment from which they can generate and sustain combat air operations. Security Police UTCs are designed to adapt to a variety of environments. Flexibility is the key element in the design of these forces and should be paramount in the mind of planners. Security Police UTCs have evolved from what began as primarily air base ground defense (ABGD) forces into "security" forces. Security forces must be capable of adapting to whatever mission they encounter when they arrive at a deployed location. That mission may be base defense in the classical infantry sense, but it could be a combination of base defense, physical security, counter terrorism, law enforcement and other police services. Even during war, order must be maintained and resources secured.

3.1.1. **Primary Mission**. The mission of deployed ABD forces is to provide a safe and secure AOR environment for sustained offensive/defensive air operations. The AOR of the SP DFC is the confines of the base plus the distance required to deter or negate medium range standoff weapons (mortars, saggers, and rocket propelled grenades) and shoulder fired surface to air missiles (SAMs). Security Police UTCs are designed to secure airfields, regardless of the type or location. Most SP UTCs are capable of deploying to MOBs, COBs, FOBs, SBs and BBs. They are also capable of securing civilian airfields, assisting U.S. Customs operations, performing a humanitarian role in natural disasters and providing control during riot situations or under martial law conditions. These are just some of the capabilities of SP UTCs. More specific notional and MRC applications will be covered in chapter 3.

3.1.2. **Capability**. Security Police UTCs are designed to provide protection for USAF resources against a variety of threats. UTCs must be capable of detecting and destroying enemy threat level I, detecting , delaying, and destroying threat level II, and delaying enemy threat level III until arrival of the tactical combat force.

3.1.3. **Terrain/Weather**. Security Police UTCs must be capable of operating in various types of terrain and climates. Security Police UTCs are equipped to perform under climatic conditions ranging from jungle to arctic. LOGDETs may need to be tailored to cover specific taskings, climates, and duration of deployment. Personnel will be equipped with mobility bags which provide the necessary clothing items for specific climatic conditions.

3.1.4. **Movement Instructions and Times**. Detailed information concerning movement times for UTCs can be found in Appendix 1, Annex A TPFDL, of the tasking OPLAN and is classified information.

3.2. Additional Information. Specific manpower, equipment, and weapons details are provided in attachments 1-5. ***NOTE:*** SP UTCs will require base resupply within 5 days for perishable items and ammunition.

3.2.1. **SP Unit Type Code Quick Reference Matrix**. This tool is designed to allow planners to quickly assess SP UTC general make-up and capabilities, and can be found in attachment 1.

3.2.2. **Personnel Detail.** Attachment 2 lists detailed information about SP UTC personnel requirements. UTC composition, capabilities, and limiting factors (LIMFACs) are listed. However, these requirements are not in concrete. Commanders may find themselves in a position to alter team makeup due to manning, mission specific requirements, or other circumstances beyond their control.

3.2.3. **Equipment Detail**. Attachment 3 describes in detail the equipment items listed in the SP UTC quick reference matrix. Security police UTC mobility equipment requirements are listed in the UTC LOGDETs. These equipment lists are developed by the MAJCOM assigned responsibilities for maintaining Manpower and Equipment Force Packaging (MEFPAK) accuracy. Commands identify a unit (designated as the pilot unit) to assist in the LOGDET's development and maintenance. LOGDETs are approved by HQ USAF/LG, produced in microfiche format by the Logistics Readiness Center (LRC), and returned to MAJCOMs for distribution to units tasked with those UTCs. LOGDETs do not include individual equipment items, personal clothing items, or additional uniform requirements. Equipment requirements for specific environments are referred to as mobility bags and cover the spectrum from individual combat equipment (i.e., load bearing equipment, ruck sack, sleeping bag, etc.) to chemical/biological warfare equipment from arctic to desert. Requirements for development, maintenance, and issue of these mobility bags are covered in AFM 67-1, Vol 2, Part II, USAF Standard Base Supply System. MAJCOMs or units are responsible for the development of additional packing lists for UTCs. These lists may include personal hygiene items, additional uniform items, and personal clothing/comfort items or items that might enhance morale or duty performance at a deployed location (e.g., credit card, calling card, amount of currency, etc.) attachment 4 provides the minimum vehicles requirements for deployed UTCs.

3.2.4. **Weapons Detail**. Attachments 5and 6 provide specific detail for the weapons used by SP UTCs to include ranges, types of ammo, rates of fire, etc. However, the employment of weapons must be determined by the situation and tactical environment. Rules of Engagement, proximity of friendly assets or civilian noncombatants may preclude the use of certain weapons. Terrain or vegetation will affect weapons capability/ employment and will be unique at each deployed location.

3.3. Security Police Unit Type Code Capabilities.

3.3.1. **Security Police Squad (QFEB2)**.

3.3.1.1. **Mission**. This 13-person UTC provides tremendous flexibility to the SP UTC concept. It is a squad capable of operating on its own in certain situations, i.e., defended locale defense, a law enforcement element, or even a recon/combat patrol element, or can augment the security police Flight (QFEBC). It can literally be "plugged in" where it is required and is trained and equipped to be plugged in to the QFEBC immediately upon arrival at a deployed location. This

UTC's importance has increased since the development of the core UTC concept and the drawdown of U.S. military forces. Currently the QFEB2 is not affected by the core concept and could become the most utilized UTC for various types of deployments. Additionally, tasking QFEB2s does not impact supporting SP squadrons as adversely as tasking QFEBCs. ACC is the MEFPAK command and the 1st Security Police Squadron, Langley AFB VA, is the pilot unit.

3.3.2. **Security Police Law Enforcement Element (QFEB9)**.

3.3.2.1. **Mission**. This 13 person UTC is designed to provide law enforcement and police services at deployed locations. Duties include directing vehicle and pedestrian traffic, apprehending and searching suspects, securing crime scenes, investigating crimes, incidents and accidents, installation entry control, pass and registration, traffic law enforcement, and resource protection. This UTC is also capable of assisting air base defenders by performing restricted area entry control duties. AMC is the MEFPAK command, and the 375th Security Police Squadron, Scott AFB IL, is the pilot unit.

3.3.3. **Security Police Headquarters Element (QFEBA)**.

3.3.3.1. **Mission**. This 22-person element is designed to provide Command, Control, and Communications (C3) for security, law enforcement, and defense forces in various environments. This UTC should precede other SP UTCs arrival at a deployed location. It is the equivalent of a squadron headquarters section and controls subordinate UTCs, i.e., four or more security police flights, canine elements, heavy weapons, fire direction centers, while providing administrative (S-1), intelligence (S-2), operations supervision (S-3), and logistics support (S-4) to those UTCs. This QFEBA is responsible for developing the base defense plan and integrating all aspects of manpower, terrain, fire support, response capabilities, and resupply into that plan. It is responsible for establishing a Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC) at locations that do not already possess a command infrastructure, and serves as the hub for base defense C3. In addition to the support listed above, this UTC provides SP defense forces with a Defense Force Commander (DFC, usually a Lt Col) and a Chief Enlisted Manager (CEM, usually a CMSgt). The DFC is the commander for all SP personnel in a base defense scenario. ACC is the MEFPAK command and the 1st Security Police Squadron, Langley AFB VA, is the pilot unit.

3.3.4. **Security Police Small Headquarters Element (QFEBB)**.

3.3.4.1. **Mission.** This 11 person UTC is designed to provide C3 and administrative support for collocated SP UTCs where there is no existing command infrastructure or where no QFEBA is deployed. This UTC is capable of performing the same mission as the QFEBA (See Paragraph 3.3.3 above) but on a smaller scale (2 - 5 QFEBCs, and various K-9, crew served weapons and other round out SP UTCs). It is critical to deploy a CATM UTC (QFEBL) with this UTC, since it does not possess that capability. ACC is the MEFPAK command for this UTC, and the 4th Security Police Squadron, Seymour Johnson AFB, NC, is the pilot unit.

3.3.5. **Security Police Flight (QFEBC)**.

3.3.5.1. **Mission**. This 44 person UTC represents the bulk of deployable SP forces, and is the SP building block of Core UTCs. It is designed, equipped, and trained to perform air base defense, security, and law enforcement missions in a variety of environments. It is comprised of three, 13 person squads, and a 5 person Combat Service and Support element (CSS) made up of three Radio/Telephone Operators (RTOs), one Flight Sergeant, and a Flight Commander (usually an Officer). For ABD purposes each squad may be further broken down into three, 4 person Fire Teams (FTs), and a Squad Leader. Typically it serves as the backbone of the base defense force by providing whatever type of defense (i.e., static, mobile, defended locales) is required and is expected to halt an enemy's advance and allow base emergency response forces to maneuver and eliminate it. The QFEBC may be tasked as a unit, or may be tasked as squads to perform a myriad of tasks, e.g., sector defense, mobile reserve, response forces or recon patrol elements. requirements will drive posting and duty shifts to include the manning of staff positions as required. This UTC is filled by both active and ARC units. ARC QFEBC manpower structure may vary from active duty teams. ACC is the MEFPAK command and the 1st Security Police Squadron, Langley AFB, VA, is the pilot unit.

3.3.6. **Security Police 81MM Mortar Team (QFEBD)**.

3.3.6.1. **Mission**. The QFEBD is a two tube, 8-person team responsible for providing indirect fire support to USAF ABD forces. The 81MM mortar is capable of delivering high explosive (HE) and white phosphorus (WP) rounds with extreme accuracy to a maximum range of 4,737 meters. It can also illuminate an 1100 sq meter (grid square) area for 75 seconds when delivered to a maximum range of 2,100 meters. It can be used to soften positions occupied by the enemy and is an excellent weapon to cover the withdrawal of friendly forces. It possesses a very limited capability against armored vehicles and is not effective against rapidly moving targets. It should not be employed without being controlled by a Fire Direction Center (FDC/UTC QFEBK). Additional information on the weapons capabilities is listed in attachment 6. ACC is the MEFPAK command, and the 554th Security Police Squadron, Nellis AFB, NV, is the pilot unit.

3.3.7. **Security Police .50 cal Machine Gun Team (QFEBF)**.

3.3.7.1. **Mission**. This 2-person UTC provides heavy automatic direct fire support to a maximum effective range of 1,800 meters and indirect fire support to a maximum range of 6,500 meters. It is capable of performing effectively against low performance fixed and rotary winged aircraft as well as light armor. It is best suited to cover vast open areas (kill zones) such as runways, highways and desert terrain. The .50 cal is most effective when mounted on a mobile platform which allows it to move where suppressive fire is required. It is an excellent convoy support weapon. This weapon is extremely powerful. Projectiles fired from this weapon are capable of traveling through several concrete walls (or aircraft) and unless that is the gunner's intent, the weapon's power and the possibility of collateral damage to assets must be considered. Employment of this weapon is ordinarily determined and its fire controlled by the sector commander. Additional information on the weapon is listed in attachment 6. ACC is the MEFPAK command, and the 554th Security Police Squadron, Nellis AFB, NV, is the pilot unit.

3.3.8. **Security Police MK19 Automatic Grenade Machine Gun Team (QFEBJ)**.

3.3.8.1. **Mission**. This two gun, 4-person UTC provides high volume, high explosive direct fire support to a maximum effective range of 2,200 meters. The MK19 provides tremendous flexibility to the base defense plan by rapidly delivering a high volume of suppression against personnel, light armor, and fortified positions. It is an excellent convoy support weapon and should be used as the backbone of final protective fires. It is capable of delivering 325-375 rounds per minute of 40MM high explosive dual-purpose (HEDP) ammunition which is capable of punching through 2 inches of armor (at 0 degrees obliquity) and high explosive (HE) ammunition (roughly equivalent to a hand grenade). This weapon is most effective when mounted on a mobile platform (HMMWV), which allows it to move where suppression is needed. The firepower of this weapon is awesome and the possibility of collateral damage to assets must be a consideration when determining how it will be employed. Because of this, its employment and use are ordinarily determined by the sector commander. Additional information on the weapon is listed in attachment 6. ACC is the MEFPAK command, and the 554th Security Police Squadron, Nellis AFB, NV, is the pilot unit.

3.3.9. **Security Police Fire Direction Center Team (QFEBK)**.

3.3.9.1. **Mission**. This 5-person UTC is responsible for organizing and coordinating the fires of heavy weapons placed in static positions. The QFEBK is designed to operate as a function of a Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC) but is capable of collocating with a Sector Command Post (CP) or can operate independently if those elements are not in place. Its most critical mission is providing fire direction and support for up to 4 QFEBDs (81mm mortar teams). QFEBK team members must request, receive, and plot accurate target reference point (TRPs) information in order to bring precise fire to bear as soon as possible. QFEBK team members MUST constantly track and maintain the most current information pertaining to aircraft flight approaches/ schedules, weather information, and the location of all friendly positions and/or routes. ACC is the MEFPAK command, and the 554th Security Police Squadron, Nellis AFB, NV, is the pilot unit.

3.3.10. **Combat Arms Training and Maintenance Support Team (QFEBL)**.

3.3.10.1. **Mission**. This 2 person UTC is designed to provide combat arms training and maintenance (CATM) support at locations without an existing CATM section or a deployed QFEBA. It is capable of conducting weapon serviceability inspections, repairing and maintaining weapons, and ensuring periodic subdepot maintenance is performed on service issue weapons to include; replacing worn or unserviceable parts, and evaluating weapons for accuracy and serviceability. AMC is the MEFPAK command, and the Air Mobility Warfare Center, McGuire AFB NJ, is the pilot unit.

3.3.11. **AFSOC Aircraft Security Team (QFEBN)**.

3.3.11.1. **Mission**. This 5 person UTC is designed to provide physical security to include entry control, internal circulation control, and security supervision for deployed AFSOC assets. Additionally these UTCs provide increased security at high threat locations and during attacks

against special operations assets, and secure special operations command centers. Multiples of this UTC may be used to provide security for large aircraft packages. These teams must interface with ABD forces when collocated. AFSOC is the MEFPAK for this UTC and the 16th Special Operations Security Police Squadron, Hurlbert Field, Fl, is the pilot unit.

3.3.12. **Security Police Patrol Dog Support Element (QFEBP)**.

3.3.12.1. **Mission**. This 2-person UTC supervises/supports Military Working Dog (MWD) Teams which make up QFEBR UTCs. QFEBPs provide 24-hour-a-day duty schedule management, training, kennel support, and other logistic support for QFEBRs. The QFEBP is responsible for coordination of veterinary support. The QFEBP will establish and maintain kennel facilities (with assistance from handlers). ACC is the MEFPAK command and the 1st Security Police Squadron, Langley AFB, VA, is the pilot unit.

3.3.13. **Security Police Patrol Dog Team (QFEBR)**.

3.3.13.1. **Mission**. Three Military Working Dog (MWD) Teams make up this UTC. Canines can be qualified as either patrol, explosives or narcotic, or combinations of the three. QFEBRs should be tailored to accomplish the primary mission, detection, and deterrence of enemy personnel. MWD Teams can be tasked as mobile or foot patrols, fixed positions or perform drug/explosives search missions as necessary. Under certain environmental conditions (high winds, extreme heat, and soil texture) canine units may become ineffective and even suffer injury if exposed for extended periods of time. This UTC requires the support of a security police Patrol Dog Flight Headquarters Element (QFEBP), which will be deployed concurrently. Additionally, veterinary support is essential. ACC is the MEFPAK Command and the 1st Security Police Squadron, Langley AFB, VA, is the pilot unit.

Chapter 4

SECURITY POLICE UTC APPLICATIONS

4.1. Applications Information. Security police UTCs were primarily developed to deploy during war in support of combat air operations. However, outside of the arena of contingencies, conflicts and war, there still exists the specter of famine and natural disasters, such as floods, earthquakes, and severe weather emergencies. The use of U.S. military forces to provide relief, enforce the law, and restore order is occurring with greater frequency. Additionally, various types of U.S. military presence may be requested by foreign governments for exercises or instruction. This chapter will illustrate potential SP UTC application during peacetime, contingencies and conflict/wartime operations.

4.2. Peacetime Operations. The peacetime use of U.S. military forces is not only legitimate for the CONUS but can be just as effective when responding to a request by a foreign government or a United Nations sanctioned effort. These tend to be time-sensitive planning crisis action operations. In most cases, any type of relief response will center (at least initially) around an airfield. Security police UTCs should be tasked to secure that airfield in order to protect USAF resources, restore order, and prevent the looting of relief effort supplies. Since, this is not a combat application, LOGDETs should be tailored to the specific requirements of the mission.

4.2.1. **SP UTC Application**. Several UTCs are applicable in this situation. Initially, either a QFEBA or QFEBB (Headquarters Elements) and two QFEB2s (SP Squad) should arrive concurrently with other elements of the USAF relief effort. The QFEBA/B would establish C3 and assess the type and number of additional SP UTCs required for the mission. This assessment process should include the physical size of the areas requiring security, number of USAF resources requiring protection, and the most current information (Intel) on the local situation to include any threat and weather information. The QFEB2s would provide the initial security for USAF resources and personnel and could later conduct convoy, defended locale, or other security missions as required. Additionally, the QFEB2s could initiate reception and bed-down procedures for follow-on UTCs. QFEBCs (SP flights) should be used to provide the manpower necessary for conducting 24-hour entry control, airfield security, and patrol activity as required. Additionally, they may perform convoy duties to protect personnel, equipment, and supplies, moving to and from airbases, or to provide and escort for distinguished visitors. Since this scenario does not involve a hostile threat other than the possibility of looting, this is not a heavy weapons environment so those UTCs are not applicable. The use of QFEBP/Rs is questionable in this environment; however, it would depend on the degree of looting/pillaging occurring or if some humanitarian use of the canine teams was required. Finally, these UTCs provide enough manpower to assist in relief efforts (i.e., construct shelters, kitchens, and establish sanitary facilities) for disaster victims.

4.3. Contingency Operations. Military operations or preemptive actions taken, with limited objectives and that don't fall into the category of a conflict or a war, are called contingencies. These are also time-sensitive operations that are usually conducted swiftly and require the quick strike capability of Special Operations, Airborne, Light-Fighter Infantry, and the appropriate

USAF air support (AC-130 gunships). Additionally, USAF fighter air cover may be required in order for AC-130s to operate unhindered. During most contingencies, airfields are priority objectives which are captured, either to halt enemy air operations or provide airfields for friendly air operations. In any case, after the initial surge, follow-on forces are required to secure these airfields, replacing combat forces tasked with subsequent missions. SP UTCs are the most likely candidates for this job.

4.3.1. **Command and Control**. These types of operations would require a QFEBA/B. These elements would assess AOR security/defense requirements and provide C^3 for those forces performing those missions. Further, these elements would coordinate all other aspects of security to include canine, FDC, and heavy weapons. They also provide administrative, intelligence, operations, and logistics support for the forces they direct.

4.3.2. **Flight and Squads**. The number of QFEBCs, QFEB2s, and QFEB9s would be determined by the threat, size of the airfield, number of USAF resources, and what role SPs would play in the restoration of order, law enforcement, and prisoner processing/transporting. These UTCs are capable of performing ABD, physical security, law enforcement, or combinations thereof (the EB9 is not equipped for a ground defense role). Dependent upon the duration of the operation, these UTCs could surge out and replace spearhead combat units, providing the threat allowed it. NOTE: These elements are trained and equipped to transition to whatever situation exists short of defeating a company, or larger enemy force.

4.3.3. **Military Working Dogs**. This is an excellent environment in which to employ canine UTCs. QFEBR canine teams could be used in several applications: searching an airport or aircraft for explosives, perimeter foot or vehicle patrols, and as an excellent psychological deterrent when securing prisoners. Depending on the size of the airport and nature of the mission, 2-4 QFEBRs and a QFEBP would be adequate.

4.3.4. **Crew Served Weapons**. Not only could mortars (QFEBDs) be used to defend the airfield, they are capable of providing extremely accurate fire support/illumination for U.S. Army units. QFEBFs (.50 cal machine guns) are capable of performing anti-aircraft and runway denial missions as well as providing an accurate heavy firepower against buildings and light armor. The MK19 automatic grenade machine guns (QFEBJs) are ideal for this type of environment. When used on a mobile platform (HMMWV), they can be used for mobile reserve, sector response teams, convoy support, or to provide mobile suppressive heavy weapons firepower wherever it is needed. Finally, a fire direction center (QFEBK) is essential to direct the fire of and provide support for the mortar teams. These actions are frequently based on deliberate planning operations. Additional information is provided in attachment 5 and 6.

4.4. Major Regional Contingency Operations. Planning for war is driven by the possibility of responding to major regional contingency (MRC) areas. OPLANs are developed to specifically task forces to predetermined locations within a given time frame. This is the broadest possible application of SP UTCs. The number of UTCs deployed will depend on the capability of the enemy forces, proximity of air bases to the forward line of troops (FLOT), number and type of USAF resources deployed, terrain features and geographical size of the areas to be defended, and

the requirements or limitations levied by the host-nation. Major regional contingencies differ from other deployment applications primarily in response and duration. Although a contingency operation possesses the potential to expand into a conflict or war, it is generally viewed as a time-critical, short-term operation. Major regional contingencies ordinarily do not transpire without a buildup of incidents, and a breakdown in diplomatic relations. The mobility process and time phased deployment system are designed to respond to the requirements of moving the troops and war-making materials into the AOR prior to open hostilities. SP UTC applications in this environment will vary with each deployed location or installation.

4.4.1. **Security Police Headquarters/Small Headquarters Elements (QFEBA/B)**. This element should be deployed with the advanced echelons (ADVON) of the US military task force. It establishes a BDOC responsible for providing administration, intelligence, security, and supply support for an ABD operation, and assesses the additional requirements necessary to secure and defend an air base. The QFEBA/B will sectorize the base, and as the required TPFDD forces arrive, begin to assign specific responsibilities to these UTCs. Eventually, the QFEBA/Bs will effectively control multiple flights and various other UTCs, from many different home stations. Additionally, the QFEBA/B serves as the hub of coordination for SP forces, and as the key point of contact for security/defense issues for U.S. Army, allied and HN security forces, as well as various intelligence gathering agencies . Finally, the QFEBA/B controls base defense operations, counterterrorism, physical security, law enforcement, mobile reserve, the fire direction center (QFEBK), crew served weapons teams, canine operations, and reconnaissance/security (R&S) patrol elements for the installation.

4.4.2. **Security Police Flight (QFEBC)**. These UTCs represent the bulk of TPFDD manpower for deployment. Flight integrity should be maintained if possible when employing these forces, however individual squads are capable of performing independent missions. Flights may be assigned either to sectors intact, or if the mission doesn't facilitate that, elements (squads, fire teams or individuals) may be pooled to perform a specific mission. These UTCs can perform a variety of missions in this environment, to include: alert aircraft area (AAA) security, mobile reserve, revetment sentries, sector response fire teams, flight line entry control points, defensive fighting positions (DFPs), and listening posts/observation posts (LP/OPs), installation entry control, antiterrorism measures (denial of personnel/vehicles to the flight line area), base-side vehicle patrols, mobile reserve, defense of key C3 facilities (defended locales), and off-base response with either HN or U.S. Army forces. Sector headquarters elements may be composed of senior leadership from QFEBCs.

4.4.3. **Security Police 81MM Mortar Team (QFEBD)**. These teams and the fire direction center (QFEBK) may be assigned to sectors, or may be centrally located and controlled by the BDOC (QFEBA/B). This weapon system may be employed in a base defense role to provide illumination when detecting or engaging the enemy, or used to detect and defeat the surface to air (SAM) footprint threat at either end of active runways, and to remove an enemy from static positions along the base perimeter (tactical) within the effective range of the weapon. Use of this weapon within built-up (urban or base-side) areas is limited at best and is not recommended due to the possibility of collateral damage to personnel and resources. For additional information on this weapon, see attachments 5 and 6.

4.4.4. **Security Police .50 Cal Machine Gun Team (QFEBF)**. This system may be employed in a static mode to cover open fields of fire out to the maximum range of the weapon. However, it is most effectively employed on mobile platforms (HMMWVs) for the purpose of runway denial and to provide mobile heavy firepower suppression anywhere along the tactical perimeter. This weapon possesses a tremendous capacity for collateral damage to personnel and resources when used base-side. QFEBFs are ordinarily controlled by the sector CP and provide a excellent degree of suppression against an attacking enemy force. It should be noted this team would be far less effective in wooded or urban terrain. For additional information on this weapon, see attachments 5 and 6.

4.4.5. **Security Police MK19 Automatic Grenade Machine Gun Team (QFEBJ)**. The MK19 is most effectively employed as a mobile suppressive fire platform covering a specific response zone within a sector and is an excellent weapon to support a blocking force action. MK19 mobile platforms (HMMWV) are also extremely effective in a convoy support role. QFEBJs may be employed to support other sectors adjacent to the base perimeter and work in conjunction with mortar teams (QFEBDs) by bringing direct firepower immediately to bear upon an enemy element. This technique allows mortar teams to deliver rounds accurately upon an enemy element already being blocked/suppressed by MK19 fire. For additional information on this weapon, see attachments 5 and 6.

4.4.6. **Security Police Fire Direction Center (QFEBK)**. QFEBKs must be deployed concurrently with mortar teams. Additionally this team can be used to support and control other heavy weapons employed in static positions.

4.4.7. **Combat Arms Training and Maintenance (QFEBL)**. This team is deployed to locations where no other CATM support exists. It should be deployed concurrently with the small headquarters element (QFEBB). It provides weapons maintenance and limited repair capability support for the SP unit and base populace.

4.4.8. **AFSOC Security Team (QFEBN)**. This UTC deploys with the resource and is not designed to be an ABD capable team, however, once it arrives at the deployed location it falls under the operational control of the DFC. AWACS and other flight line resources require the type of physical security this UTC has been designed to provide.

4.4.9. **Security Police Patrol Dog Support Element/Security Police Patrol Dog Team (QFEBP/Rs)**. These teams may be used in a variety of applications. Their primary responsibility is to randomly patrol areas of the installation to detect and deter enemy personnel. The QFEBP is responsible for coordinating veterinary support, developing work schedules, and conducting proficiency training for MWD teams. Canine teams may also augment response teams, conduct bomb searches, and assist in personnel security operations (PSO). When deploying a QFEBR in a contingency ensure that a QFEBP is deployed concurrently. Planners should not deploy a QFEBP to a location where kennel and supervisory support are already inplace.

4.4.10. **Security Police Squad (QFEB2)**. This UTC provides the greatest flexibility to planners and commanders of any UTC during war or conflict and may be used in a variety of applications. They can be "plugged" in to augment flights, be assigned missions as recon/security patrol elements, detached to protect a defended locale on their own, or be tasked to perform work details such as building bunkers, fortifying CPs and filling sandbags. They are also capable of protecting a convoy (when assigned required vehicles), adapting to law enforcement/physical security flight duties as well as deploying with special operations units to provide security at BBs and FOLs.

4.4.11. **Security Police Law Enforcement Element (QFEB9)**. This element provides tremendous flexibility to the family of SP UTCs, when deployed into an MRC environment. By using the QFEB9 to perform the law enforcement mission (traffic control, base circulation control, accident investigations, pass and registration, and other police services), other UTCs can effectively dedicate manpower to base defense and physical security. This UTC can also be used to secure priority resources to allow other types of UTCs to perform a active defense role.

4.5. Mobility Planning Considerations. The checklists provided in the remainder of this chapter are designed to assist the Defense Force Commander (DFC) and UTC Troop commander to prepare for a mobility tasking. The mobility process begins with predeployment actions and continues through deployment, employment and redeployment until the mission is complete. The checklists are a framework of what needs to be accomplished, but not how. Detailed information on how these tasks are to be accomplished can be found in AFH 31-302, Air Base Defense and Contingency Operations Handbook and AFH 31-303, Basic Combat Skills Handbook.

4.5.1. **Predeployment Considerations Checklist (DFC and UTC Troop Commander)**.

- Taskings:

  -- Which OPLANs (MRC) are you tasked to support?

    --- Review DOC Statements.
    --- Review OPLAN TPFDLs for specific destination information.
    --- Review unit and MAJCOM supporting plans.
    --- Contact supported command to determine unique requirements (training, clothing, communications, language, etc.).
    --- Determine UTC training requirements.

- Load Planning:

  -- Fighting Load (establish SOP for LBE, weapons, ammo, and protective equipment)
  -- Existence Load (establish SOP for packing the ruck)
  -- Contents of mobility and personal bags.

- Training:

-- Nature of the mission (train the way you will fight).
-- Location of mission (what environment will you fight in).
-- Develop training, exercise, and evaluation programs to prepare troops for that mission.
-- Deploy to RTCs or JRTC.
-- Identify and train supported command unique requirements.
-- Coordinate with Wing and MAJCOM CVI to build ORE and ORI scenarios that simulate MRC taskings.
-- Additional training considerations:

--- Nuclear, biological and chemical warfare.
--- Weapons training (qualification, proficiency, and specialist).
--- Special Purpose Vehicles and drivers licenses.
--- Mobility(cargo prep, palletization, hazardous cargo handling and transportation, records and forms).

- Medical:
-- Medical support available at deployed location.
-- Profiles.
-- Mental Health.
-- Dental or orthodontics.
-- Allergies.
-- Humanitarian assignment issues.

- Administrative:

-- UTC personnel roster.
-- Orders.
-- Mobility records.
-- Shot records.
-- Dog tags.
-- Passports.
-- Personal Reliability Program (PRP).
-- Security clearances.
-- Military pay information.
-- Weapons qualifications records.
-- Medical and dental records.
-- Enlisted specialty training records.
-- Upgrade and WAPs training materials.
-- I.D. card check and update.
-- LOGDET and individual equipment inventory.
-- Authorized personal equipment list.
-- Standard operating procedures (SOPs).
-- Weapons serial numbers listing.
-- Admin supplies for deployed location.
-- Directives library.

-- UTC recall roster.
-- Emergency data card update.

- Legal.

-- Last Will and Testament.
-- Power of Attorney.
-- Tax issues.
-- Marital issues.
-- Single parent or guardian issues.
-- Insurance issues (SGLI, civilian life, and others).

4.5.2. **Deployment Considerations Checklist (DFC and UTC Troop Commander)**.

- Individual Equipment Requirements:

-- "A" Bag (generic combat equipment, ruck, LBE, etc.).
-- "B" Bag (cold weather clothing and equipment).
-- "C" Bag (NBC warfare equipment).
-- "D" Bag (desert clothing and equipment).
-- Existence load (ruck) and fighting load (LBE, helmet, vest).
-- Authorized personal equipment.
-- Disposition of weapons and ammo (initial issue) during transportation.

- Cargo Preparation.

-- Specific aircraft type load configuration.
-- LOGDET and personal equipment.
-- LOGDET ammo (and other hazardous cargo).
-- Troop seating and floor load (rucks and weapons).
-- Mobility documents (manifest, Mobility/Manpower Requirements Resources Roster).

- UTC Movement.

-- By aircraft (Air Mobility Command/USAF).

--- Military aircraft (C-5, C-141, C-130, KC-10, KC-135).
--- Civilian Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) .
--- Contract flights.

-- By ground transportation (Military Transportation Management Corps/US Army).

--- Trucks and buses.
--- Railway.
--- Port operations.

-- By ship (Military Sealift Transportation Service/US Navy).

--- Military ship transport.
--- Contract ship transport.

- Schedules.

-- Estimated departure (reverse planning).
-- Personnel show time (location, uniform, etc).
-- Telephone stand-by times and restrictions.
-- Briefing times (location, uniform, etc).
-- Inspections and rehearsals.
-- Transportation.

4.5.3. **Employment Considerations Checklists (DFC)**.

- Arrival.

-- Wing Commander brief (receive mission and confirm ROE).
-- Threat Assessment from Regional Security Officer (or AFOSI).
-- Host Nation or theater rules of engagement, local laws, etc.
-- Site survey to determine the actual TPFDL follow-on force requirements including:

--- Mission - Security, police services, air base defense,antiterrorism, and air defense.
--- Enemy- What level threat?
--- Terrain - Observation and fire, Key Terrain, Obstacles,Cover/Camouflage/ Concealment, Avenues of Approach (OKOCA).
--- Weather - In detail to include general circulation.
--- Troops- Not only what you require, but what you can realistically expect to receive.
--- Support - What type of support structure currently exists, what type or amount you expect to receive and what you actually require.
--- Time-Duration of mission, TPFDL force arrival, etc.

- Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC).

-- Establish communications and coordination with Wing Operations Center (WOC), Rear Area Operations Center (RAOC/US Army), Joint Rear Area Tactical Operations Center (JRTOC, US Army or Marine Corps).
-- Locate and initiate S-1 through S-4 staff operations.
-- Sectorize base tactical area of operation (AOR).
-- Provide command, control and communications for sectors.
-- Develop reception and bed down plans for SP TPFDL forces.
-- Conduct operations groups.

-- Develop base defense plan to include:

--- Security (aircraft alert areas, revetments, fuel, etc).
--- Police services (traffic control, convoy, investigations, etc).
--- Circulation control (entry control, gates, barriers).
--- Air Defense (Stinger, US Army Hawk or Patriot, host nation systems).
--- Ground Defense (Detection screen, patrols, mobile response forces, heavy weapons, tactical sensors).
--- Mobile Reserve (blocking force, maneuver element, reinforcements).
--- Integrate Augmentation and Selective Arming.
--- Enemy Prisoner of War Holding.
--- Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO).
--- Withdrawal plan (under pressure/without pressure).

-- Site and initiate kennel operations (if applicable).
-- Site and initiate armory operations.
-- Identify vehicle requirements.
-- Initiate Admin Support (S-1) Operations to include:

--- 1st Sgt (BDOC Security, internal control).
--- Strength reporting.
--- Conduct of operations groups.
--- Casualty reporting.
--- Admin support to DFC.
--- Coordinate on hospital support issues.
--- Manpower issues.
--- Postal issues.
--- Pay issues.
--- Personal/legal issues.
--- Directives library.
--- WAPs library.
--- Upgrade training materials.
--- Morale, Welfare, and Recreation issues.

-- Initiate Intel Section (S-2) Operations to include:

--- Attend Joint Staff intelligence briefs.
--- Attend next higher unit operation groups.
--- Provide DFC and staff with intelligence summaries and projections at operations group.
--- Provide time hack, weather update for operations group.
--- Conduct mission debriefs.
--- Interrogate EPWs.
--- Brief sectors on threat.

-- Initiate Operations Section (S-3) operations.
  --- Attend Joint Staff briefs.
  --- Coordinate Host Nation/Army Support.
  --- Attend next higher unit operations groups.
  --- Operate the BDOC.
  --- Provide C3 for base defense operations.
  --- Supervise sectors, defended locales, kennels, armory and fire direction center.
  --- Develop base defense maps, overlays, checklists.
  --- Coordinate Air Defenses.
  --- Coordinate selective arming of owner user personnel.
  --- Maintain 24 hours log (blotter).
  --- Receive and transmit reports.
  --- Provide attack early warning.
  --- Maintain forms required for base defense operations.
  --- Maintain and issue communications materials (SOIs).
  --- Inspect/approve sector positions and operations, issue ROE.

-- Initiate Supply Section (S-4) operations.

  --- Identify mission essential shortfalls to next higher echelon or Joint staff (J-4).
  --- Absorb collective UTC LOGDET equipment.
  --- Establish flexible but effective system for equipment accountability.
  --- Develop supply /resupply schedule.
  --- Coordinate maintenance for vehicles and equipment.
  --- Provide CATM weapon cleaning repair area.
  --- Coordinate base operating support (BOS) with supply.
  --- Coordinate with base fuels and disseminate schedule.
  --- Coordinate with base services for support.

4.5.4. **Employment Considerations Checklist (UTC Troop Commander)**.

- Arrival.

-- Transportation of personnel from aircraft to billets.
-- Billeting.
-- Food and water availability.
-- Personal hygiene and sanitation facilities.
-- DFC in-brief (mission, ROE, threat, etc).
-- Host nation in-brief.

- Occupation.

-- Search, clear, and secure area (unless accomplished)
-- Attend operations groups.
-- Coordinate with adjacent sectors or forces.

-- Initiate sector setup (initial and final).
-- Initiate routines in defense to include:

--- Security (mission or shift).
--- Weapons cleaning.
--- Personal hygiene.
--- Sleep.

-- Develop sector security map with overlays to include:

--- Fire plan.
--- Communications plan.
--- Track plan.
--- Response, coordination, and resupply points.
--- Mines, sensors, and channeling devices.
--- Target reference points.
--- Aircraft parking areas.
--- Entry control points.
--- Gates.
--- Key facilities.

-- Establish transportation schedules for shifts.
-- Conduct guardmounts, inspection, and briefs.

4.5.5. **Redeployment Considerations Checklist (DFC and UTC Troop Commander)**.

- Return to home station or subsequent mission.
- Nature and location of subsequent mission.
- Scale down base defense as threat allows.
- Reconsolidate UTCs.

-- Personnel.
-- Equipment.
-- Records.

- Palletize equipment
- Transportation.

-- Type (aircraft, ground, or ship).
-- Administrative (orders, passports, manifest, etc).
-- Customs.

- Arrival at deployed location (see employment checklists).
- Arrival at home station.

-- Mission debrief.
-- Equipment turn-in.
-- Rest and recuperation schedules.
-- Return to normal duty rotation.
-- Complete trip report and identify lessons learned.
-- Submit lessons learned into Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS).

STEPHEN C. MANNELL, Brig General, USAF
Chief of Security Police

Attachment 1
SP UTC QUICK REFERENCE MATRIX

SP UNIT TYPE CODE (UTC) QUICK REFERENCE MATRIX

UTC	TITLE	MANNING			WEAPONS									EQUIPMENT											
		OFFICER	ENLISTED	MWD	M9 PISTOL	M16 RIFLE	M203 GL	M249 SAW	M60 MG	M2 50CAL HMG	MK-19 GMG	M27 MORTAR	SHOTGUN	AN PVS 4	AN TVS 5	AN PVS 5&7	GPS PLGR	LALPS/AN PAQ4	ATV	Repeaters	Base Station	GOV Adapters	Radios	Switchboard	Field Telephone
QFEB2	SP SQUAD		13		1	10	3	2	1					3		7		7	1				4		4
QFEB9	LE SQUAD		13		13	13							5			3							4		4
QFEBA	SP HQ ELE.	4	18		4	22								6	2	5	1		3	2	2	6	8	2	10
QFEBB	SMALL HQ ELE.	2	9		4	11										5	1		2	2	1	3	4	2	8
QFEBC	SP FLIGHT	1	43		4	35	9	6	3					9		22	1	22	4	1	1	4	14	1	14
QFEBD	81MM MORTAR TM		8			8						2				4							2		2
QFEBF	50CAL HVY MG TM		2			2				1					1	2							1		1
QFEBJ	MK19 MG GL TM		4			4					2				2	4							2		2
QFEBK	FIRE DIR CEN TM		5			5											2						1	1	1
QFEBL	CATM SUPPORT TM		2			2																	1		1
QFEBN	AFSOC SEC TM		5		5	5	1						2	1		2	1	2	1	1	1	1	3	1	3
QFEBP	SP K9 SUPPORT ELE		2			2																	2		2
QFEBR	SP MWD ELEMENT		3	3	3	3										3							3		

Attachment 2

PERSONNEL DETAIL

UTC	COMPOSITION	CAPABILITIES	LIMITING FACTORS
QFEB2	Security Police Squad. Normal configuration is 13; one 3P07X (E-5/E-6) squad leader with the remainder of the squad made up of 3P0XX (E-5s) and below. May be grouped with other QFEBCs to form a "lean" flight. in this configuration the team has little of the organic support/standalone capability of the QFEBC.	Equipped to perform resource protection, physical security and base defense missions.	If deployed to a location requiring the UTC to be self-sustaining, requires Base Operating Support (BOS) within 5 days.
QFEB9	Law Enforcement squad. Normal configuration is 13; one 3P07X (E-5/E-6) squad leader with the remainder of the squad made up of 3P0XX (E-5s) and below. Composed of 3P0X2 personnel with various police service skills.	Manned and equipped for law enforcement missions. However, can be used to backfill physical security requirements.	If deployed to a location requiring the UTC to be self-sustaining, requires (BOS) within 5 days.
QFEBA QFEBB	Security Police Headquarters The QFEBA is composed of 22 personnel. Normal configuration is one 31P4, one 31P3/1, one 3PX90, one 8F000, two 3A0XXs, two 3P1XXs with the remainder a mix of 3P0XXs E-7s and below. The Small Headquarters Element or QFEBB is composed of 11 personnel with approximately ½ the AFSs as the QFEBA.	Provides command and control, centralized communications , administration (S-1), intelligence (S-2), operations (S-3), and logistics (S-4) support to subordinate UTCs in the resources protection and physical security roles. The QFEBA Provides communications link with higher headquarters for a large SP organization (4 or more QFEBCs. The QFEBB is composed of 11 personnel and is designed to oversee small to medium SP organizations (less than 4 QFEBCs). Normally deployed to bases where no SP command and control (C^2) exists or where the existing C^2 system cannot handle increased mission requirements.	Not equipped to perform base defense mission without ABD forces. The primary difference between the QFEBA and QFEBB is that the latter does not include CATM personnel. QFEBBs must be accompanied by a QFEBL as necessary. If deployed to a location requiring the UTC to be self-sustaining, requires BOS after five days.
QFEBC	Security Police Flight Normal configuration is 44; one 31P3/1 flight commander and one 3P07X flight sergeant with the remainder composed of 3P0XXs E-6s and below in three 13 person squads. The remaining 4 personnel are radio-telephone operator (RTO) qualified 3P0XXs.	Equipped to perform resource protection, physical security and base defense missions.	If deployed to a location requiring the UTC to be self-sustaining, requires Base Operating Support (BOS) within 5 days.

PERSONNEL DETAIL

UTC	COMPOSITION	CAPABILITIES	LIMITING FACTORS
QFEBD	81MM Mortar Teams. Normal configuration is two tubes and eight 3P0XXs. Four of these positions may be filled by 3P1XX substitutes, two on each team.	The mortar is an indirect fire, crew served weapon capable of pin-point accuracy used to engage troops, bunkers, and vehicles. Mortars can: illuminate an area of approximately 1100 sq. meters for 75 seconds per round out to a range of 2100 meters.; deliver HE or WP explosives out to a range of 4000 meters; conceal a target of 4000 sq. meters in 30 seconds with 3 rounds of smoke ammunition. Its maximum rate of fire is 12 rds/min.	Requires a properly emplaced baseplate for accurate fire. If deployed to a location requiring the UTC to be self-sustaining, requires (BOS) within 5 days.
QFEBF	M2 .50 caliber Machine Gun Team. Normal configuration is two 3P0XXs. One of these positions may be filled by 3P1XX substitutes.	Provides ABD missions with heavy automatic weapons fire support out to a maximum range of 6800 meters. Effective against targets such light armored and unarmored vehicles and low flying aircraft. Most effectively employed when mounted on vehicles such as the M1025/1026 HMMWV.	A heavy weapon weighing 128 Lbs (barrel, receiver, and tripod). As such it is not man-portable and ideally should have a four person crew. The ammunition is also very heavy and the weapons high rate of fire consumes large amounts quickly. If deployed to a location requiring the UTC to be self-sustaining, requires Base Operating Support (BOS) within 5 days.
QFEBJ	Mark 19 40MM Automatic Grenade Machine Gun Teams. Normal configuration is two guns and four 3P0XXs. Two of these positions may be filled by 3P1XX substitutes, one on each team.	Provides ABD missions with automatic, high explosive, direct and indirect fire support out to a maximum range of 2200 meters. Effective against buildings, light armored, unarmored vehicles and troops. Most effectively employed when mounted on vehicles such as the M1025/1026 HMMWV. Its maximum rate of fire is 375 rds/min.	A heavy weapon weighing 132 Lbs (weapon and tripod). As such it is not man-portable and ideally should have a four person crew. The ammunition is also very heavy and the weapons high rate of fire consumes large amounts quickly. If deployed to a location requiring the UTC to be self-sustaining, requires Base Operating Support (BOS) within 5 days.

PERSONNEL DETAIL

UTC	COMPOSITION	CAPABILITIES	LIMITING FACTORS
QFEBK	Security Police Fire Direction Center. Normal configuration is five 3P0XXs with at least two of these as E-5/E-6s. One of these positions may be filled by a 3P1XX substitute.	Provides support, maintenance, and supervision of crew served weapons teams (Mortar, M2 and Mk-19). Can direct the fires of up to four 81MM Mortar teams. Plots fire missions, friendly forces locations, and target reference points; and delivers the firing solution to the weapons teams. Can monitor SP, targets, weather, and air traffic.	Operates most efficiently when under the control of an QFEBA/B If deployed to a location requiring the UTC to be self-sustaining, requires BOS after five days.
QFEBL	Combat Arms Training and Maintenance Team Normal configuration is two 391XX personnel E-5 and below.	Provides weapons maintenance, training and limited repair capability at deployed locations where CATM support does not exist or where the existing support cannot handle increased mission requirements	If deployed to a location requiring the UTC to be self-sustaining, requires (BOS) within 5 days.
QFEBN	AFSOC Aircraft Security Team. Normal configuration is five 3P0X0 personnel E-5 and below.	Provides close-in security and entry control for AFSOC aircraft when deployed away from home station and away from USAF main operating bases.	Requires BOS upon arrival at deployed location.
QFEBP	Security police MWD headquarters element. Normal configuration is two 3P0X2A personnel, E-5 and below. One acts as the deployed MWD Supervisor and the second acts as a deployed MWD Journeyman/Trainer	Provides supervision and control for up to 4 QFEBR teams.	If deployed to a location requiring the UTC to be self-sustaining, requires (BOS) within 5 days.
QFEBR	Security police military working dog element. Normally configured of three 3P0X2A MWD handlers with their assigned MWDs.	Teams can be used in fixed positions or as patrol elements. The specific type of MWDs deployed (patrol, patrol-drug detector, or patrol-bomb detector) is based on the unit mission and MWD availability.	MWD teams have unique requirements and limitations. Temperature extremes, weather conditions, and terrain can effect MWD capabilities. Consider facilities, veterinary support and supply requirements for kennels before requesting deployment of MWD assets. Should be deployed with a QFEBP when deployed to locations without existing kennel facilities If deployed to a location requiring the UTC to be self-sustaining (with a QFEBP), requires Base Operating Support (BOS) within 5 days.

Attachment 3

EQUIPMENT DETAIL
(Night Vision)

NOMENCLATURE	DESCRIPTION	CAPABILITIES	REMARKS/LIMFACS
AN PVS-4 Night Vision Sight (NVS), Individual served weapons.	A night vision device mounted on the M16 rifle or M60 machine gun. Magnifies ambient light. Battery powered.	Can be used as both night observation device and for target acquisition. Level of ambient light determines range, target visibility, and effectiveness.	Scope and rifle must be zeroed prior to use. Scope is ineffective where artificial light is abundant and during daylight hours.
AN/TVS-4 Night Observation device (NOD).	Tripod mounted. Magnifies ambient light. Battery powered.	Provides night observation out to a range of 1500 meters. Level of ambient light determines maximum effective range and target clarity.	Heavy, the unit weighs 34 Lbs. without tripod, as such it is not man-portable. Scope is ineffective where artificial light is abundant and during daylight hours.
AN/PVS-5 or 7 Night Vision Goggles (NVG)	Binocular (PVS-5) or monocular (PVS-7) NVGs attached to a head harness. Have both infrared and light amplification modes. Battery powered	Man-portable, hands-off, individual night vision device. Has an adjustable focus from 10 to 75 meters.	Goggles are ineffective where artificial light is abundant and during daylight hours.
Infrared Aiming Light	Infrared light source mounted on the M16 rifle or M60 machine gun. Battery Powered.	Provides target infrared illumination at night or in darkened buildings. Effective out to a range of 150 meters when mounted on the M16 and out to 2000 meters when mounted on M60s.	Must be used in conjunction with AN/PVS-5 or 7 NVGs. Should not be used where artificial light is abundant and during daylight hours. Should not be used until cleared by AF/SG.
PAQ-4A Infrared Aiming Device	Same as for Infrared Aiming Light	Same as for Infrared Aiming Light	Same as for Infrared Aiming Light

EQUIPMENT DETAIL
(Special Purpose Equipment)

NOMENCLATURE	DESCRIPTION	CAPABILITIES	REMARKS/LIMFACS
All Terrain Vehicles (ATV)	A two- or four- wheel drive, one person, all-terrain, off-road motorcycle engine driven tactical transport.	Short-range, multipurpose, all-terrain, off-road one person (with all personal equipment) transport. Air transportable. Can tow specially designed trailer to lay comm. wire, make resupply runs, etc.	Operation requires specialized training due to danger of overturning, especially at high speeds, when overloaded, or when operated by inexperienced personnel. Also effective as runway control transportation on dirt or damaged runways where standard tactical vehicles become a liability and for intra-flight couriers.

EQUIPMENT DETAIL
(Communications)

NOMENCLATURE	DESCRIPTION	CAPABILITIES	REMARKS/LIMFACS
Scope Shield II Tactical Radio Base Station.	Interoperable, base station for the Scope Shield II Radio System.	Deployable world-wide up. 24 kilometer range in the high or low VHF, plus UHF bands. 10 channels available with power choices of 5/16/40 watts available power on three frequency bands available: 30-88 MHz 138-174 MHz 406-470 MHz	Available to units in September 1993. Scope Shield systems c currently in use may be pre-production test models which are NOT Interoperable with production models. The pre-production models also have severe range limitations. Secure voice mode is compatible with US Army SINGARS system in the single channel mode. Enhances Scope Shield tactical hand-held radios for fire clear and secure voice in the net control, information liaison and combat operations.
Scope Shield II Tactical Radio Repeater	Interoperable, clear and secure voice repeater for the Scope Shield II Radio System.	Deployable world-wide up.	Same as for the Scope Shield base station. Extends Scope Shield base station transmission range up to 24 kilometer range in the high or low VHF, plus UHF bands. See above for further information.
Scope Shield Tactical Radio Vehicle Adapter	Metal housing and electrical connections needed to mount a Scope Shield radio in a vehicle.	Facilitates the conversion of a hand-held Scope Shield II radio to vehicle operation. Powered by either 12VDC or 24VDC	Same as for the Scope Shield base station.
Global Positioning System (GPS/PLGR)	Satellite plotted navigation device used to determine location, increase accuracy in delivering fire, and vehicle navigation.	Pinpoints GPS transmitter location within 10 meters. Used by fire direction centers (FDC) for plotting indirect fire.	Available June 1994.
Scope Shield II Tactical Hand-held Radio	Light-weight, interoperable radio designed for use by security police in ABD	Capable of operating in the clear or secure voice modes over short ranges.	Operates at low transmission wattage (2 watts maximum power) to allow inter-squad communication while preventing an enemy for intercepting friendly radio communications.
Non-Tactical, Land, Mobile Radio (LMRs) e.g.; Motorola Saber, MT-300/500, etc.	Commercially available hand-held radios widely used by security police at home station.	Vary by type and make. Capabilities may include: - simplex or duplex operations. - secure voice mode. - up to 5 watts power.	Operates on frequencies very susceptible to jamming and/or interception and requiring local clearance. Large variety, lack of battery chargers and need for a base station make interoperability questionable. Useful for weapons system security and law enforcement operations.

EQUIPMENT DETAIL
(Vehicles)

NOMENCLATURE	DESCRIPTION	CAPABILITIES	REMARKS/LIMFACS
M-35 2½ Ton Cargo Truck **UTC: QFEB5**	Special purpose, multi-wheel drive cargo vehicle.	Capable of transporting a squad of 13 security police with all their equipment (minus pallets). This is an all-weather, all-terrain diesel powered transport capable of being equipped with river fording devices. Capable of towing most cargo trailers.	Drivers require special training prior to operation. Exhaust noise requires driver and cab passengers to wear hearing protection. Required for towing water buffalos.
M1025/1026 HMMWV **UTC: QFEB3** --- M10XX UA-HHV UTC: QFEB8	High Mobility, Multi-Wheeled Vehicle. Comes in a variety of versions from cargo truck to ambulance. The M1025/1026 Armament Carrier version is the most common one issued to SPs. The M1026 mounts a 6000 Lb. winch at the front bumper, the M1025 does not. The Up Armored Heavy HMMWV is a lightly armored version of the standard vehicle.	Transports a four person fire team and all their equipment and weapons. This is an all-weather, all-terrain diesel powered transport capable of being equipped with river fording devices. Can tow a M101 trailer Can serve as an effective weapons platform for the M60, M2 machine guns, or the MK 19 grenade machine gun when properly equipped.	Limited rearward view, requires spotter whenever backing. Not designed for "creature comforts," this vehicle has a limited capacity heater for passengers and the passenger/cargo compartment is not waterproof. All cargo should protected against weather damage. Not a substitute for the CUCV (military version of the Chevrolet "Blazer"®). Nor is the CUCV a replacement for the HMMWV.

Attachment 4

ABD UTC VEHICLE REQUIREMENTS MATRIX

	HMMWV M998	HMMWV M1025/1026	CUCV M1008/1009	2½ TON/M35 5 TON/M925	CARGO TRL M101	CARGO TRL M105	WATER TRL M105
QFEB2		1			1		
QFEB9			3				
QFEBA	1	3		2	3	1	2
QFEBB	1	2		1	2	1	1
QFEBC		4			3		
QFEBD	2						
QFEBF		1					
QFEBJ		2					
QFEBK							
QFEBL	1						
QFEBN							
QFEBP	1						
QFEBR	1						

Attachment 5
ABD WEAPONS MASTER CHART
(Weapons)

TYPE	MINIMUM & MAXIMUM RANGES (Meters)	MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE RANGE (Meters)	APPLICATIONS	TYPE OF AMMUNITION	REMARKS
M9 Pistol	0 - 1800	50	Personal defense weapon	9mm Ball	15-round magazine
M16A1 Rifle	0 - 2700	460	Man-sized targets out to medium ranges. Can stop unarmored vehicles	5.56mm ball and/or tracer.	20 or 30 round magazines
M16A2 Rifle	0 - 3600	550	Man-sized targets out to medium ranges. Can stop unarmored vehicles	5.56mm ball and/or tracer.	20 or 30 round magazines
M203 Grenade Launcher	31 -400	50 - 350	Effective against man-sized and group targets. Can stop unarmored vehicles. Can provide aerial illumination and smoke.	40mm High Explosives (HE), Smoke, illumination, High Explosive/Dual Purpose (HEDP).	Launcher mounted beneath M16 hand guards. HEDP round penetrates up to 2" of armor.
M249 Squad Automatic Weapon	0 - 3600	1000	Effective against point and area, personnel and unarmored vehicle targets. Provides a large volume of fire.	Linked 5.56mm ball and tracer. (4 to 1 mix)	Belt, magazine or box fed
M60 Machine Gun	0 - 3725	1100	Effective against point and area, personnel and light-armored vehicle targets. Provides a large volume of fire.	Linked 7.62mm ball, tracer and/or armor-piercing.	Belt fed
M72 Light Antitank Weapon	10 - 1000	200	Anti armor and anti bunker	HE	Issued as a single unit of ammunition. (Launcher is disposable once fired.) Round penetrates up to 30 cm of armor/bunkers/etc.
M2 .50 Cal Machine Gun	0 - 6800	1830	Effective against point, area, light-armored vehicle targets and low-flying aircraft. Provides a large volume of fire.	Linked .50 caliber ball, tracer, and armor-piercing.	Belt fed
MK 19 40mm Machine Gun	20 - 2200	1500 - 2212 (point - area)	Effective against point, area, and light-armored vehicle targets. Provides a large volume of fire in area suppression role.	Linked 40mm HEDP	Belt fed Can provide indirect fire when a forward observer is available.
81mm Mortar	70 - 4737	4737	Indirect fire weapon used against bunkers, troop concentrations, vehicles and for illumination.	81mm HE, White Phosphorous (WP), and illumination rounds.	Used in battery of 2-4 tubes.

Attachment 6

CREW SERVED WEAPON DETAIL

M60 EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

MISSION: The M60 machine gun provides a high rate of accurate fire for both point and area targets. On missions that collateral damage is to be avoided, minimize the use of the M60. The M60 provides good covering fire for maneuver elements or to cover fixed positions. The high rate of fire makes the M60 an excellent weapon for denying terrain or access to structures. The only better weapon is mines. The good range of the M60 makes it's use in a fixed position with traverse and elevation (T&E) mechanism an excellent choice to disrupt troop concentrations and disable light vehicles. The M60 used as a "free gun" on a vehicle adds movement to the flexibility described above. Use the M60 on almost all missions except where collateral damage is the primary concern.

TERRAIN: With a maximum range of 3725 meters and a maximum effective range of 1100 meters the M60 can cover a lot of terrain. The weapon should be employed to cover those areas that offer optimum fields of fire, covering likely avenues of approach. Fields of fire is that ground which allows observation of the enemy throughout the area of operation and the ability to bring the maximum amount of grazing fire on the enemy. Avenues of approach are those terrain features, road networks most likely to be used to gain access to your location. Those areas within range of the M60, but not covered by the machine gun (nature of the ground, intervening obstacles) should be covered with another direct fire weapon, M203 fire, indirect fires, or mines (command detonated claymores).

TARGETS: During air base defense operations the likely threat encountered will be saboteurs, terrorists, or a squad size element. The M60 is the flights primary weapon against a dismounted enemy. The M60 provides a high volume of lethal, accurate fire to break up an enemy assault. Machine gunners should always attempt to engage at their maximum effective range and strive for grazing fire. Grazing fire occurs when your fire does not rise more than 1 meter (about waist high) above the ground. When firing over level, unobstructed, or uniformly sloping terrain, a maximum of 600 meters of grazing fire can be obtained. Grazing fire gives the gunner a horizontal depth of targets within their designated fields of fire. Fires from a vertical platform (tower/multi-story roof top) offer a limited depth of fire. The key to effective firepower is mobility and placement of the M60 at strategic points. Placing the M60 in a static position limits the maneuver capability of the gunner to support all aspects of the defense. The best targets are people in the open where you have good fields of fire. Unarmored or lightly armored vehicles engaged on approach are also good targets. The M60 will have no effect on armored vehicles other than keeping the crews or riding troops buttoned up inside, reducing their visibility.

ROE: Rules of Engagement may restrict the use of the M60. In an urban environment consideration must be taken to ensure that noncombatants are not harmed by the weapon's potential. Further restrictions may apply within your defended locale. M60 rounds will stop light vehicles and damage aircraft. This weapon reaches out there; use it carefully. No "Rambo" moves, unless holes in every thing is the desired result. There is a high probability of collateral damage to your assets, if preplanned fires are not designated by the leadership.

M60 EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS	PRIMARY USE	WEAPONS MIX	WEATHER EFFECTS	RATES OF FIRE	AMMO TYPES
LONG-RANGE, MAY CAUSE COLLATERAL DAMAGE	AGAINST DIS-MOUNTED ENEMY	M203 FOR DIRECT/ INDIRECT FIRE TARGETS 150M TO 350M	WPNS OPERATION NONE	SUSTAINED 100RDS/MIN (RECOM-MEND BARREL CHANGE EVERY 10 MIN)	BALL
MAX RANGE 3725M	BREAK UP ENEMY ASSAULT	MK 19 FOR DIRECT OR INDIRECT FORE OUR TO A MAX EFF RANGE OF M60	TARGET ACQUISITION AFFECTED BY WEATHER CONDITIONS - OVERCOME BY RANGE CARD/ - PRE-REGISTERED FIRES -FORWARD OBSERVER		ARMOR-PIERCING
MAX EFF RANGE 1100M	CONVOY PROTECTION			RAPID 200 RDS/MIN (BARREL CHANGE EVERY 2 MIN)	TRACER
EMPLOY IAW THEATER ROE	SPT IN OFF/DEF OPS				BLANK
TRIPOD W/TRAVERSE & ELEVATION (TO&E) MECHANISM FOR GRAZING FIRE	AGAINST SOFT OR LIGHT ARMORED VEH	81MM FOR ILLUM/INDIRECT FIRE		CYCLIC 550 RDS/MIN (BARREL CHANGE EVERY MIN)	DUMMY
PEDESTAL MOUNT FOR VEH/HIGH DEGREE OF MOBILITY	AGAINST SLOW/LOW FLYING AIRCRAFT	M18A1 CMD DETONATED MINE TO COVER MINE FIELD ONCE ENEMY HAS ENTERED			
VISUALLY INTIMIDATING DETERRENT FACTOR		AUGMENT M2/M249 DIRECT FIRES			
LT WT/HIGHLY MOBILE					

81-MM MORTAR EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

MISSION: In air base defense operations, the 81-MM mortar provides fire on long range targets, close defensive fires, and final protective fires (FPF). The 81-MM mortar provides the commander organic (his own) indirect fire support as an integral part of his defense plan. On missions where collateral damage is to be avoided, disregard the use of this weapon unless absolutely necessary. The acceptance level of collateral damage should be considered prior to the use of the 81-MM mortar. Mortars are used to engage dismounted infantry beyond the range of direct fire weapons (destroy enemy forces), control key terrain (man made or natural), and to provide illumination. The GDFC can also use mortars against armored vehicles by using high explosives (HE) rounds to cause the crews to button up and reduce their effectiveness. Whenever possible, mortars should be fired in battery to reduce the mobility of the enemy and possibly canalize the enemy into prearranged kill zones. Exercise extreme caution when firing illumination rounds. The flight path of the round is critical because of the deposited canister the ILLUM cartridge is packed in. This deposited canister (mortar trash) can be sucked into the intake of a jet engine.

TERRAIN: With a maximum range of 4800 meters, the 81-MM mortar can cover a lot of terrain with indirect fire. The mortar should be employed to cover key terrain features and likely avenues of approach. Key terrain features is any area that the seizure or retention of affords a marked advantage to whoever occupies it. Key terrain may be dominating high ground, major road intersections, or terrain that overlooks critical points. Avenues of approach are those terrain features and/or road networks most likely to be used to gain access to your location. Those areas within range of direct fire weapons (M60, M2, M249), but not covered by fire due to the nature of the land or man made obstacles can be covered by indirect fire from the 81-MM mortar.

TARGETS: The 81-MM mortar is the GDFC's largest organic indirect fire weapon available during air base defense operations. The commander should use mortars to engage dismounted infantry beyond the range of his own direct fire weapons. Mortars can be used against armor, causing the crew to button up, reducing their effectiveness. Do not misunderstand the employment of mortars against armored vehicles. The mortar is not an anti-armor weapon, but a means to reduce their effectiveness. Plan to use mortars against the enemy's direct and indirect fire capability. When developing your fire support plan you should target all confirmed and suspected enemy locations, likely avenues of approach, and on prominent terrain features that may be used as an enemy overwatch position. Consider targeting your own position, so that if the enemy penetrates friendly defenses, effective fire is delivered immediately. The GDFC should be familiar with the type of rounds available and their effectiveness against different targets. The high explosive (HE) round gives good results when used on lightly built structures, but does not perform well against reinforced concrete structures. White phosphorus (WP) is used for screening, producing casualties, incendiary action, and signaling. Exercise caution when firing the WP round. It has a tendency to produce fires that you did not plan for or anticipate. In the defense, illumination (ILLUM) is planned to burst behind friendly troops to put them in the shadow and place enemy troops in the light.

ROE: Rules of engagement and Host Nation agreements may restrict the use of the 81-MM mortar. In an urban environment consideration must be taken to ensure that noncombatants and their property are not harmed or destroyed by the weapon's potential. The base commander may restrict use of the mortar for fear of excessive collateral damage. The fear of collateral damage is often the result of lack of commander education on mortar capabilities. Properly employed, the 81-MM mortar can provide an operational and tactical edge for our air base defense troops.

81-MM MORTAR EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS	PRIMARY USE	WEAPONS MIX	WEATHER EFFECTS	RATES OF FIRE	AMMO TYPES
FIRED FROM FIXED POSITION IN BATTERY (LIMITED MOBILITY) PUTTING GUN INTO OPERATION (INITIAL SET-UP APPROX. 1 HR HIGH INNER BASE COLLATERAL DAMAGE IF FIRED W/IN PERIMETER EMPLOY IAW THEATER ROE MORTAR TRASH (ILLUM/FOD) ON RUNWAY	ILLUM INDIRECT FIRE SPT TO THE DFC IN THE DEFENSE - FIRES ON LONG RANGE TARGETS-CLOSE DEFENSIVE FIRES - FINAL PROTECTIVE FIRES (FPF) - INDIRECT FIRE AGAINST DIS-MOUNTED ENEMY - BREAK UP ASSAULT - INDIRECT FIRE ON PRE-REGISTERED OR OBSERVED TARGETS	M203 FOR DIRECT/ INDIRECT FIRE TARGETS 150M TO 350M MK 19 FOR DIRECT AND INDIRECT FIRE ON TARGETS OUT TO MAX EFF RANGE OF 1500 M M18A1 CMD DETONATED MINE TO COVER MINE FIELD ONCE ENEMY HAS ENTERED AUGMENT M2/M60/M249 DIRECT FIRES ON FINAL PROTECTIVE LINE (FPL)	WPNS OPERATION NONE LIMITED VISIBILITY FIRING OVERCOME BY: -RANGE CARD -FORWARD OBSERVER - TARGET REFERENCE POINTS	RATES OF FIRE VARY DEPENDING ON NUMBER OF CHARGE BAGS USED BASIC RATE OF FIRE IS 12 RDS/MIN FOR 2 MIN, THEN 4 RDS/MIN SUSTAINED	HIGH EXPLOSIVES (HE) WHITE PHOS-PHOROUS (WP) ILLUMIN-ATION (ILLUM) TRAINING (TP)

BROWNING MACHINE GUN CALIBER .50 HB, M2
EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

MISSION: The M2 caliber .50 provides a heavy volume of close, accurate, and continuous fire for both point and area targets. The long range, penetration power, and accuracy form an integral part of any unit's defensive fire plan. On missions where internal and external collateral damage is to be avoided, minimize the use of the M2. The M2 provides good covering fire in the attack, the defense, or to cover fixed positions. The heavy volume of fire makes the M2 an excellent weapon for denying terrain or access to structures (wood or concrete). The good range of the M2 in a fixed position with traverse and elevation (T&E) mechanism is an excellent choice to disrupt troop concentrations and disable lightly armored vehicles. A thorough analysis of the tactical situation should be developed before the weapon is positioned. The excessive weight of the weapon (128 lbs) will restrict your movement considerably. Once positioned on the ground it's not easy shifting to the "free gun" vehicular mount flexibility by the M60.

TERRAIN: With a maximum range of 6800 meters and a maximum effective range of 1830 meters the M2 can cover a lot of terrain. The weapon should be employed to cover those areas that offer optimum fields of fire, covering likely avenues of approach. Field of fire is that ground which allows observation of the enemy throughout the area of operation and the ability to bring the maximum amount of grazing fire on the enemy. Avenues of approach are those terrain features, road networks, or air routes most likely used to gain access to your location. Preplanned registered fires cover those areas that are obscured due to natural terrain features or obstruction from man made obstacles. The long range of the weapon allows you to fire on targets that are not visible to the gunner. By using a forward observer, target reference points (TRP's), and the T&E mechanism, gunners can put plunging fires on any registered point. Plunging fire is obtained when firing from high ground into low ground, when firing at a high angle reference the target. Dead space that cannot be covered by the M2 should be covered by indirect fires, MK19, M203, mortar or mines (command detonated claymores).

TARGETS: The M2 can support the security police in the attack or primarily in defense with a continuous rate of accurate, extremely lethal fire. The M2 is also used to defend against low flying hostile aircraft, destroy lightly armored vehicles, and reconnaissance by fire on suspected enemy positions. It's exceptional long range gives the defender a tactical advantage in stand-off capability. Machine gunners should always attempt to engage at their maximum effective range and strive for grazing fire. Grazing fire occurs when your fire does not raise more than 1 meter (about waist high) above the ground. When firing over level, unobstructed, or uniformly sloping terrain, a maximum of 1000 meters grazing fire can be obtained. The best targets are troops in the open where you have good fields of fire. Unarmored or lightly armored vehicles are also good targets. The M2 can destroy lightly armored vehicles such as armored personnel carriers (APC) but, has little or no effect against main battle tanks (MBT) other than to keep the crew buttoned up.

ROE: Rules of engagement may restrict the use of the M2. In an urban environment consideration must be taken to ensure that noncombatants are not killed by the weapon's potential. Further restrictions may apply at your defended locale. The M2 caliber .50 rounds have the potential to penetrate several aircraft causing severe damage. Not only does the weapon reach out there, it can take out several critical resources before it looses it's impact power. To avoid collateral damage, plan meticulously your employment of the Browning machine gun caliber .50 HB, M2.

BROWNING MACHINE GUN CALIBER .50 HB, M2
EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS	PRIMARY USE	WEAPONS MIX	WEATHER EFFECTS	RATES OF FIRE	AMMO TYPES
LONG-RANGE, MAY CAUSE INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL COLLATERAL DAMAGE MAX RANGE 6800 M MAX EFF RANGE 1830 M EMPLOY IAW THEATER ROE TRIPOD W/TRAVERSE & ELEVATION (TO&E) MECHANISM FOR DIRECT/INDIRECT FIRE PEDESTAL MOUNT FOR VEH/HIGH DEGREE OF MOBILITY VISUALLY INTIMIDATING DETERRENT FACTOR EXTREMELY HEAVY (128 LBS)	DIRECT FIRE - AGAINST DIS-MOUNTED ENEMY - REQUIRES ARMORED VEH TO BUTTON UP REDUCING VISIBILITY - BREAK UP ENEMY ASSAULT/ RALLY POINT - DESTROY FRAME/CONCRETE BUILDINGS - AGAINST SLOW FLYING AIRCRAFT -RECON BY FIRE - INDIRECT FIRE WITH T&E - PRE-REGISTERED OR OBSERVED TARGETS - COVER DEAD SPACE - DENY USE OF TERRAIN BY FIRE - CHANNEL ENEMY MOVEMENT	M203 FOR DIRECT/ INDIRECT FIRE TARGETS 150M TO 350M 81MM FOR ILLUM OR INDIRECT FIRE M18A1 CMD DETONATED MINE TO COVER MINE FIELD ONCE ENEMY HAS ENTERED AUGMENT M2/M249 DIRECT FIRES ON FINAL PROTECTIVE LINE (FPL)	WPNS OPERATION NONE TARGET ACQUISITION AFFECTED BY WEATHER CONDITIONS -OVERCOME BY RANGE CARD/ PRE-REGISTERED FIRES -FORWARD OBSERVER	SUSTAINED 40RDS/MIN OR LESS (WITH BARREL CHANGE) RAPID 40 RDS/MIN (WITH BARREL CHANGE) CYCLIC 450 TO 550 RDS/MIN SINGLE SHOT CAPABILITY	BALL ARMOR-PIERCING (AP) TRACER AP/INCENDIARY BLANK DUMMY

MINE, ANTIPERSONNEL, M18A1 (CLAYMORE)
EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

MISSION: The M18A1 mine is a curved, rectangular fiberglass mold with 700 steel balls backed by 1.5 pounds of C-4. When the mine is detonated, a fan-shaped pattern of the steel balls is projected in a 60 degree horizontal arc out at a maximum height of 2 feet. Although the M18A1 covers a lot of ground when detonated, it does not possess the far reaching capabilities of crew-served weapons. It's purpose is to supplement the ground defense force commander's (GDFC) defense plan, by providing close-in barrages delivered to the side of/ front of the enemy's direction of movement. The M18A1 antipersonnel mine is used as part of the base defense obstacle plan. It is intended to stop, delay, and disrupt enemy attacks. By reducing the enemy's mobility and channeling (directing) enemy formations, the GDFC can increase the effectiveness of friendly fire on an enemy assault. Numerous innovative ways of mine employment can be found for base defense operations. With remote firing capability, the M18A1 can be placed along likely avenues of approach creating a highly effective ambush zone. The M18A1 can be used to fill the dead space in final protective fires of your direct fire automatic weapons. In addition to its effects on personnel, the M18A1 can cause significant damage to thin skinned vehicles such as HMMWVs and trucks. The steel balls will puncture tires, gas tanks, crank cases, and other vital engine components. Consider employing a command detonated mine at entry control points as close in protection against an enemy assault. In all cases, the hazard presented by employing the M18A1 (Claymore) mine in built-up areas must be taken into account. Also, because of the danger of back-blast (16m), caution should be exercised in using the M18A1 in proximity to friendly forces.

TERRAIN: When detonated the forward "danger radius" of the M18A1 is approximately 250 meters. The M18A1 should be employed to cover those areas not covered by organic weapons (nature of the ground, intervening obstacles) and likely avenues of approach (roads, dead space). Additionally, the mine is an excellent force multiplier for small arms and crew-served weapons to deny the use of ground and kill the enemy. For best effect, the employing squad/ flight must make sure that the mines used can be kept under observation and covered by fire at all times.

TARGETS: The M18A1 supports the security police primarily in the defense of static fighting positions, LP/OPs, likely infiltration routes (avenues of approach) and in certain cases, critical assets. The M18A1 is primarily used as an antipersonnel mine, but can be used to damage "thin skinned" vehicles such as HMMWVs and trucks. Personnel detonating the mine should fire when the enemy is within a 50-100 meter zone forward of the mine. At this range the M18A1 is extremely lethal.

ROE: Rules of engagement will restrict the use of the M18A1 mine. The mine can be detonated by electrical or nonelectrical means upon command or by tripwire. Either employment factor limits its use due to the high probability of harm to noncombatants. Current Air Force doctrine does not authorize the employment of the M18A1 mine in the tripwire/booby-trap mode. When using the M18A1 mine take into consideration the proximity of other antipersonnel mines. With the heavy volume of steel balls going down range, double detonations have occurred when the original intention was to set off one mine. Each deployed location could have ROE that dictate additional requirements

MINE, ANTIPERSONNEL, M18A1 (CLAYMORE)
EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS	PRIMARY USE	WEAPONS MIX	WEATHER EFFECTS	RATES OF FIRE	AMMO TYPES
DETONATED BY - COMMAND - TRIPWIRE DANGER OF BACK BLAST DOUBLE-DETONATIONS WHEN IMPROPERLY DEPLOYED EMPLOY IAW THEATER ROE EXTENSIVE COLLATERAL DAMAGE IF FIRED W/IN PERIMETER	PROVIDES CLOSE-IN BARRAGES TO STOP, DELAY, DISRUPT ENEMY ATTACKS ALONG LIKELY AVENUES OF APPROACH TO REDUCE MOBILITY CHAN-NELING ENEMY ASSAULT INITIATE AMBUSH COVER DEAD SPACE IN FINAL PROTECTIVE FIRES	SUPPLEMENTS - CREW SERVED WEAPONS -INDIRECT FIRE WEAPONS - INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS	WPNS OPERATION NONE LIMITED VISIBILITY FIRING OVERCOME BY MINEFIELD RECORD	SINGLE BLAST COMMAND/ REMOTE, TRIPWIRE DETONATED SERIES OF MINES COMMAND, REMOTE, TRIPWIRE DETONATED	700 SMALL STEEL BALLS BACKED BY 1.5 LBS OF C-4

GRENADE MACHINE GUN, 40MM, MK19

MISSION: The MK19, 40MM grenade machine gun provides a heavy volume of close and continuous fire to repel attacking ground forces. It is capable of producing a heavy, continuous volume of controlled and accurate fire for both point and area targets. The MK19 uses both the high explosive (HE) and high explosive dual purpose (HEDP) ammunition. On missions where internal and external collateral damage is to be avoided, minimize the use of the MK19. The MK19 provides good covering fire in the attack, the defense, or to cover fixed positions. The heavy volume of fire makes the MK19 an excellent weapon for denying terrain or access to structures (wood or concrete). When using the traverse and elevation mechanism (T&E), the MK19 has good range and is an excellent choice to disrupt troop concentrations and destroy lightly armored vehicles. Best results come from preregistered targets using a range card. Additionally, when vehicle mounted, the MK19 can respond to any position and engage the enemy with prearranged range cards. Ensure a thorough analysis of the tactical situation is developed before the position or weapon is employed. When using a "free gun" much more ammunition will be used to engage the same target, had preregistered fires been used.

TERRAIN: With a maximum range of 2,212 meters (2,212 meters area targets/ 1,500 meters point targets), the MK19 can cover a lot of terrain. The weapon should be employed to cover those areas that offer good fields of fire, covering likely avenues of approach. Fields of fire is that ground which allows observation of the enemy throughout the area of operation and the ability to bring the maximum amount of fire on the enemy. Avenues of approach are those terrain features and road networks most likely used to gain access to your location. Preplanned registered fires cover those areas that are obscured due to natural terrain features or obstruction from manmade obstacles. By using a forward observer, target reference points (TRPs), and the T&E mechanism, gunners can engage unseen targets with deadly accuracy. Cover any dead space with command detonated claymore mines (M18A1).

TARGETS: The MK19 can support the security police in the attack or primarily in defense with a continuous rate of accurate, extremely lethal fire. The MK19 is used to engage troops in the open, destroy lightly armored vehicles, and reconnaissance by fire on suspected enemy positions. It's long range and high explosive (HE)/high explosive dual purpose (HEDP) munitions give the defender a tactical advantage in a stand-off capability. Machine gunners should always attempt to engage targets at the maximum effective range of their weapons. The best targets are troops in the open, point or area, with unobstructed fields of fire. Unarmored or lightly armored vehicles are also good targets. The MK19 can destroy lightly armored vehicles such as armored personnel carriers (APC) but, has little or no effect on main battle tanks (MBT) other than to keep the crew buttoned up.

ROE: Rules of engagement may restrict the use of the MK19. In an urban environment extreme caution must be taken to ensure that noncombatants are not killed by the weapon's lethal potential. Further restrictions may apply at your defended locale. The HE and HEDP rounds have the potential to penetrate several aircraft causing severe damage. To avoid extensive collateral damage, plan meticulously your employment of the MK19 40MM grenade machine gun.

GRENADE MACHINE GUN, 40MM, MK19

EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS	PRIMARY USE	WEAPONS MIX	WEATHER EFFECTS	RATES OF FIRE	AMMO TYPES
LONG-RANGE, MAY CAUSE COLLATERAL DAMAGE	DIRECT FIRE -AGAINST DIS-MOUNTED ENEMY	M203 FOR DIRECT/ INDIRECT FIRE TARGETS 150M TO 350M	WPNS OPERATION NONE	SUSTAINED 40RDS/MIN	HIGH EXPLOSIVE (HE)
MAX RANGE 2212M	- REQUIRES ARMORED VEHICLES TO BUTTON UP REDUCING VISIBILITY	M203 FOR DIRECT/INDIRECT FORE FOR TARGETS 150M TO 350M	TARGET ACQUISITION EFFECTED BY WEATHER CONDITIONS -OVERCOME BY RANGE CARDS - REGISTERED FIRES -FORWARD OBSERVER	RAPID 60 RDS/MIN	HIGH EXPLOSIVE-DUAL PURPOSE (HEDP)
MAX EFF RANGE 1500M				CYCLIC 375 RDS/MIN	TRAINING/ PRACTICE (TP)
EMPLOY IAW THEATER ROE					
TRIPOD W/TRAVERSE & ELEVATION (TO&E) MECHANISM FOR GRAZING FIRE	- BREAK UP ENEMY ASSAULT	M2 FOR DIRECT OR INDIRECT FIRE OUR TO A MAX EFF RANGE OF MK19			DUMMY
	- CONVOY PRO-TECTION				
PEDESTAL MOUNT FOR VEH/HIGH DEGREE OF MOBILITY	- RECON BY DIRECT OR INDIRECT FIRE WITH T&E	81MM FOR ILLUM/INDIRECT FIRE			
VISUALLY INTIMIDATING DETERRENT FACTOR		M18A1 CMD DETONATED MINE TO COVER MINE FIELD ONCE ENEMY HAS ENTERED			
LT WT/HIGHLY MOBILE	- AGAINST REGISTERED OR OBSERVED TARGETS	AUGMENT M2/M60/M249 DIRECT FIRES ON FINAL PROTECTIVE FIRES (FPL)			
	-COVER DEAD SPACE				
	-CHANNEL ENEMY MOVEMENT				

Attachment 7

DEFENSE FORCE PLANNING MODELS

LOW END AIR BASE DEFENSE FORCE MODEL

ASSUMPTIONS:

1. LEVEL I THREAT HIGH
2. LEVEL II THREAT LOW
3. SMALL BASE LAND AREA
4. ONE MASS PARKING RAMP
5. ONE SUPPORT AREA
6. ONE CANTONMENT AREA
7. JOINT/HOST NATION/ALLIED SUPPORT FOR EXTERNAL/OFF BASE SECURITY TO INCLUDE DETECTION AND NEUTRALIZATION OF SHOULDER FIRED SURFACE TO AIR WEAPONS AND INDIRECT FIRE WEAPONS SUCH AS 120/81MM MORTARS.
8. VEHICLES AVAILABLE **
9. CURRENT EQUIPMENT
10. OPEN TERRAIN/NON-URBAN - NON JUNGLE
11. REQUIRES THE DEPLOYMENT OF 1 COMMUNICATIONS UTC 6KMQ8 (2 PERSON) TEAM FOR SCOPE SHIELD II RADIO SUPPORT
12. POINT AIR DEFENSE PROVIDED BY HOST NATION OR U.S. ARMY

REQUIREMENTS:

NUMBER	*TYPE*	*MAKE-UP*	*TOTAL*
1	QFEBB-SM HQ	11	11
1	QFEBL-CATM	2	2
1	QFEBP-K-9 SUPT	2	2
4	QFEBR-K-9 TEAM	3	12
2	QFEB9-LE SQUAD	13	26
6	QFEBJ-MK-19	2	12
4	QFEBC-FLIGHT	44	176
4	QFEB2-SQUAD	13	52
		TOTAL	293

** MOBILITY IS A CRUCIAL FORCE MULTIPLIER FOR DEPLOYED SP UNITS. IF VEHICLES ARE NOT AVAILABLE, SECURITY POLICE MANPOWER MUST BE INCREASED TO SIX FLIGHTS AND SIX SQUADS TO COMPENSATE. TOTAL OF 407 PERSONNEL REQUIRED.

HIGH END AIR BASE DEFENSE FORCE MODEL

ASSUMPTIONS:

1. LEVEL I THREAT HIGH
2. LEVEL II THREAT HIGH
3. LARGE BASE AREA
4. MULTIPLE RAMPS
5. MULTIPLE SUPPORT AREAS
6. MULTIPLE CANTONEMENT AREAS
7. NO JOINT/HOST NATION/ALLIED SUPPORT FOR EXTERNAL/OFF BASE SECURITY IN IMMEDIATE AIRFIELD AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY.
8. URBAN/JUNGLE TERRAIN
9. VEHICLES AVAILABLE **
10. CURRENT EQUIPMENT
11. REQUIRES DEPLOYMENT OF 1 COMM UTC 6KMQ8 (2 PERSON) TEAM FOR SCOPE SHIELD II RADIO SUPPORT
12. POINT AIR DEFENSE PROVIDED BY HOST NATION OR U.S. ARMY

REQUIREMENTS:

NUMBER	*TYPE*	*MAKE-UP*	*TOTAL*
1	QFEBA- LG HQ	22	22
3	QFEB9-LE SQUAD	13	39
2	QFEBP-K-9 SUPT	2	4
8	QFEBR- K-9 TEAM	3	24
2	QFEBK-FDC	5	10
4	QFEBD-81 MM	4	16
4	QFEBF-50 CAL	2	8
10	QFEBJ-MK-19	2	20
1	QFEBL-CATM	2	2
15	QFEBC/1-FLIGHT	44	660
15	QFEB2-SQUAD	13	195
	TOTAL		1000

** MOBILITY IS A CRUCIAL FORCE MULTIPLIER FOR DEPLOYED SP UNITS. IF VEHICLES ARE NOT AVAILABLE, SECURITY POLICE MANPOWER MUST BE INCREASED TO 22 FLIGHTS AND 22 SQUADS TO COMPENSATE. TOTAL OF 1399 PERSONNEL REQIURED.

Attachment 8

AIR BASE DEFENSE ARCHITECTURE

This attachment identifies the inter-relationship among the governing documents of current Air Base Defense *doctrine, policy* and *tactics* within the Air Force security police.

Air Base Defense Doctrine - The principles of war, within the frame work established by the executive branch of our government drives all doctrine. The following documents define ABD doctrine and remind the user that they are authoritative, but require judgment in application. (Joint Pub 1-01)

Joint Publication 3-10: "Doctrine for Joint Rear Area Operations," sets forth doctrine governing joint rear area operations. It provides guidelines for unified and specified commanders, other joint force commands and subordinate component commands for coordinating and integrating security operations with other operational responsibilities. This document is primarily used by the Joint Staff, Unified Commands, Joint Task Forces, Air Staff, and MAJCOMs.

AFDD 44: "Air Force Air Base Defense," by providing Air Force ABD doctrine. AFDD 44 establishes guidance for planning, coordinating and executing operations to defend Air Force air bases. This document will assist staff officers and subordinate commanders in carrying out duties. This document supersedes and replaces AFM 3-3. It is primarily used by the Air Staff, MAJCOMs, and SP academy.

Air Base Defense Policy - To convert doctrinal statements into action, we have devised the documents listed below. These documents explain our doctrine and set specific policies for air base defense.

AFPD 31-3: "Air Base Defense," provides guidance necessary to achieve an effective level of protection for war fighting resources. It sets out overall responsibilities in and around Air Force bases operating in threat levels I, II, and III. This document is designed to assist USAF/SP operational planners in preparing for ABD operations. This document is used primarily by the Air Staff, MAJCOMs, SP Units, and SP Academy

AFI 31-301: "Defending Air Bases," provides guidance for ABD operations planning and conduct by expanding on the responsibilities outlined in AFPD 31-3. This document is used by commanders and planners when writing unit plans and identifying training requirements for ABD. This document supersedes and replaces AFR 206-1. This document is used primarily by the Air Staff, MAJCOMs, MAJCOM Training Squadrons/Flights, SP Units, and SP Academy.

Air Base Defense Tactics -

Joint Publication 3-10.1: "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (JTTP) for Base Defense," establishes common command, control ad communications procedures used in the defense of rear areas between commanders of base clusters and their higher headquarters and other clusters. This document also sets forth operational concepts, analysis, planning, command and control, intelligence, communications, and host-nation support procedures, as well as the responsibilities of base cluster and subordinate commanders. This document applies to the tactics and procedures established by the commanders of combatant commands, subordinate unified & component commands, and joint task forces. This document is used primarily by Joint Task Forces, MAJCOMs, MAJCOM Training Squadron/Flights, and SP Academy

AFH 31-302: "Air Base Defense and Contingency Operations," provides standardized collective tactics, techniques, and procedures for conducting the defense of an air base. This handbook provides the employment

concepts and details for implementing the policy drivers listed above to the squadron and flight level leaders. It accomplishes this by expanding on the information contained in JP 3-10.1. This document supersedes and replaces AFR 206-2. It is used primarily by the Air Staff, MAJCOMs, MAJCOM Training Squadrons/Flights, SP Units, and SP Academy.

AFH 31-303: "Basic Combat Skills Handbook," provides procedures and detailed applications for training personnel in individual combat skills. This document provides squadron trainers, and squad and fire team leaders with standardized topics and performance measures on all basic combat skills in support of the collective skills implemented in AFH 31-302. This document supersedes and replaces the "I" series Educational Subject Block Indexes. This document is used primarily by the MAJCOM Training Squadrons/Flights, SP Units, and SP Academy.

AFH 31-305: "Security Police Deployment Planning Handbook" provides security police planners at the joint, MAJCOM, air component and commander level with a quick reference for deliberate planning within the confines of the policy drivers described above. This guide contains the full spectrum of SP capabilities and mission profiles and allows the user to plan responses to all current and projected missions including humanitarian, peacekeeping, disaster relief, and worldwide contingencies. This document amends and supersedes AFR 206-3. This document is used primarily by the MAJCOMs, MAJCOM Training Squadrons/Flights, SP Units, and SP Academy.

Attachment 9

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

AIR MOBILITY CONTROL CENTERS - Extensions of the TACC at key en route locations. AMCCs consist or aerial port, logistics, and operations centers. AMCCs monitor and manage en route operations and serve as an interface with host base/wing commanders.

AREA OF OPERATIONS (AO) - That portion of an area of war necessary for military operations and for the administration of such operations.

AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (AOR) - A defined area of land in which responsibility is specifically assigned to the commander of the area for the development and maintenance of installations, control of movement, and the conduct of tactical operations involving troops under the commander's control, along with parallel authority to exercise these functions.

BASE DEFENSE OPERATIONS CENTER (BDOC) - A command and control facility established by the base commander to serve as the focal point for base security and defense. It plans, directs, integrates, coordinates, and controls all base defense efforts, and coordinates and integrates into area security operations with the rear area operations center/rear tactical operations center.

BASE DEFENSE PLAN - Defense measures by a base to provide internal and perimeter security. Measures include organizing and preparing personnel and equipment for defense of the base.

CONVOY/ESCORT OPERATIONS - During contingency operations, SPs may be required to conduct convoy/escort operations. This duty may range in scope from escorting equipment or supplies, to providing self-protection when traveling from one location to another. When planning for this operation, consider rules of engagement (ROE), vehicle employment, vehicle spacing, halts, breakdowns, and actions on enemy contact.

DEFENDED LOCALES - Areas designated as critical resources and/or key terrain that gives you a tactical advantage over the enemy.

DEFENSIVE FIGHTING POSITION (DFP) - A position from which a unit defends a specified area of responsibility.

DIRECT FIRE - Gunfire delivered on a target, using the target itself as a point of aim for either the gun or the director.

ENTRY CONTROL POINTS (ECPs) - Manned points that allow access to a base and/or restricted areas within the confines of a base.

FINAL PROTECTIVE FIRE (FPF) - An immediately available prearranged barrier of fire designed to impede enemy movement across defensive lines or areas.

FORWARD LINE OF OWN TROOPS (FLOT) - A line which indicates the most forward positions of friendly forces in any kind of military operation at a specific time. The forward line of own troops normally identifies the forward location of covering and screening forces.

GROUND DEFENSE FORCE COMMANDER (GDFC) - The senior Air Force tactical commander's principal representative for base defense operations. The GDFC plans, organizes, directs, coordinates, and controls air base defense activities.

INDIRECT FIRE - Fire delivered on a target that is not itself used as a point of aim for the weapons or the director.

LEVEL I - Agent, partisan, sympathizer, and/or terrorist activity which must be defeated by base defense forces.

LEVEL II - Small tactical units, unconventional warfare forces, and/or guerrillas which must be delayed or defeated by base defense forces with assistance from a response force.

LEVEL III - Conventional force operations including airborne, air assault, amphibious and/or infiltration operations which must be delayed by base defense forces until a tactical combat force is deployed to defeat the threat.

LISTENING POSTS/OBSERVATION POSTS (LPs/OPs) - Tactically placed positions along likely avenues of approach to an installation that provide early warning capability against enemy infiltration trying to disrupt sortie generation or mission execution.

MOBILE RESERVE - A response force possessing mobility, firepower, and flexibility for operating against all levels of threat. The size of the reserve will be determined by: the threat; the size and topography of the base; base defense forces available; and the number, type, and disposition of critical base resources.

POSSE COMITATUS ACT - (18 USC 1385) Prohibits search, seizure, or arrest powers to US military personnel. Amended in 1981 under PL 97-86 to permit increased DoD support of drug interdiction and other law enforcement activities.

SECTOR - An area designated by boundaries within which a unit operates, and for which it is responsible.

NATO STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENT (STANAG) - The record of an agreement among several or all the member nations to adopt like or similar military equipment, ammunition, supplies, and stores; and operational logistic, and administrative procedures. National acceptance of a NATO allied publication issued by the Military Agency for Standardization may be recorded as a Standardization Agreement.

SUPPRESSION - Temporary or transient degradation by an opposing force for the performance of a weapons system below the level needed to fulfill its mission objectives.

TACTICAL COMBAT FORCES (TCF) - A combat unit, with appropriate combat support and combat service support assets, that is assigned the mission of defeating Level III threats.

TANKER AIRLIFT CONTROL CENTER (TACC) - The Air Mobility Command direct reporting unit responsible for tasking and controlling operational missions for all activities involving forces supporting USTRANSCOM's global air mobility mission. The Tanker Airlift Control Center is comprised of the following functions: current operations, command and control, logistics operations, aerial port operations, aeromedical evacuation, flight planning, diplomatic clearances, weather, and intelligence.

TANKER AIRLIFT CONTROL ELEMENTS (TALCE) - A deployed organization established at fixed, en route, and deployed locations where air mobility operational support is non-existent or insufficient. The Tanker

Airlift Control Element provides on-site management of air mobility airfield operations to include command and control, communications, aerial port services, maintenance, security, transportation, weather, intelligence, and other support functions, as necessary. The Tanker Airlift Control Element is composed of mission support elements from various units and deploys in support of peacetime, contingency, and emergency relief operations on both a planned and "no notice" basis.

TERRORIST THREAT CONDITIONS (THREATCONS) - A Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-approved program standardizing the Military Services' identification of and recommended responses to terrorist threats against US personnel and facilities. This program facilitates inter-Service coordination and support for antiterrorism activities.

THREATCON NORMAL - This condition applies when a general threat of possible terrorist activity exists but warrants only a routine security posture.

THREATCON ALPHA - This condition applies when there is a general threat of possible terrorist activity against personnel and facilities, the nature and extent of which are unpredictable, and circumstances do not justify full implementation of THREATCON BRAVO measures. However, it may be necessary to implement certain measures from higher THREATCONS resulting from intelligence received or as a deterrent. The measures in this THREATCON must be capable of being maintained indefinitely.

THREATCON BRAVO - This condition applies when an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. The measures in this THREATCON must be capable of being maintained for weeks without causing undue hardship, affecting operational capability, and aggravating relations with local authorities.

THREATCON CHARLIE - This condition applies when an incident occurs or intelligence is received indicating some form of terrorist action against personnel and facilities is imminent. Implementation of measures in this THREATCON for more than a short period probably will create hardship and affect the peacetime activities of the unit and its personnel.

THREATCON DELTA - This condition applies in the immediate area where a terrorist attack has occurred or when intelligence has been received that terrorist action against a specific location or person is likely. Normally, this THREATCON is declared as a localized condition.

Attachment 10

USERS FEEDBACK

1. Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this document by removing this page and sending it to HQ AFSPA. Please fill out the following:
User: _____ Unit: _____
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2. **Content.**

a. Does the document provide a conceptual framework for the topic?_____
_____
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b. Is the information provided accurate? What needs to be updated?_____
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c. Is this publication consistant with other AF documents?_____
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